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Preface
This Master’s thesis is born out of a growing unease with the general discourse on im-
migration and immigration policy in Norway. What at times appears as an ongoing
discussion concerning the amount, and potential negative impact, of immigrants, asylum
seekers and refugees that should or should not be admitted into Norway, has become an
overarching container for a plethora of important discussions on the underlying issues
of globalization, the Norwegian welfare state, secularism and religion, cultural identity,
ethnicity, citizenship—and, central to this thesis; what it entails to be Norwegian.
Whereas a Norwegian identity may or may not exist as a unique conglomerate—that
is, as particular to Norwegians—consisting of a range of cultural, ethnic and political
idiosyncrasies, it is never the less present a posteriori, vocally defended when viewed
as a target being threatened by external pressure. This external threat, it seems when
looking into the Norwegian public debate, is primarily constituted by ‘foreign-culturals’,
that is, migrants from beyond the Western cultural community—none more foreign than
Muslims. Originating from a range of more or less vocal actors across the Norwegian
political spectrum, cries for support in defending Norwegian values and culture is medi-
ated through newspapers, television and radio on a daily basis, creating an environment
where the baser instincts of homo Norvegicus are allowed to thrive and flourish.
Norwegianness—in the vast majority of its subscribers—is neither problematized nor
properly conceptualized until it meets this foreign ‘constitutive outside’, forcing into play
a renewed interest in what it means to be Norwegian. The value-oriented tenets of
Norwegianness, however, are at times indistinguishable from the core ideas of the more
classic conceptions of European enlightenment. The Enlightenment, both as historical
epoch as well as ongoing civilizing project (in its multiple understandings and facets),
is fundamental as a backdrop in the construction of a binary opposition between the
rational and agency-driven (while emphatically good-hearted) ‘Us’ as opposed to the
cultural-psychologically driven, abject, immigrant ‘Other’.
Research Question
Whereas this thesis is primarily concerned with two core themes—i.e. Norwegianness as
well as the securitization of threats to it—several important themes are necessarily closely
related: as the text intends to show, securitization and renewed discursive importance of
national culture is a pan-European phenomenon. Furthermore, much of the rhetoric used
across borders is in fact common, to the degree that it seems necessary to investigate
the commonalities of the values propagated en masse, as the idea of a European or
Western Enlightenment-specific ‘culture’ is portrayed as equally under siege. In following
a somewhat social-constructivist line of investigation, the instigators and actors—and
their motives—within this dynamic of threat and response is attempted scrutinized:
• How is the security of Norwegian culture employed in creating negative images of
immigration and immigrants? Who propagates this idea, and to what end?
The Structure of this Thesis
In the introduction, the thesis at hand will try to situate itself in relation to the ongoing
Norwegian discourse on migration. A presentation of academic themes that are either
adjacent or directly analogous to the thesis itself will be given, arguing towards a holistic
approach to discourse as the meaning being produced within an interdisciplinary and
inter-medial space. The field of migration research (as the core of the program in which
this thesis is delivered) will be presented, as well as comments on existing literature on,
and current conceptions of Norwegian majority culture, multiculturalism and ‘clashes of
culture’.
The second chapter will address the methodological presumptions associated with
doing research on public discourse. Critical Discourse Analysis, both applied as method as
well as a more epistemological and normative point of view will be discussed, particularly
in relation to the discursive formation of truth (i.e. justified fear) as understood in
Foucauldian terms. Furthermore, the cognitive matrix of methodological nationalism—
and lack of critical analysis of ‘the national order of things’—is suggested as the underlying
foundation of the contemporary ethnic, cultural and political dynamics that create the
conditions under which all political action is either legitimized or restricted.
Chapter 3 attempts to carve out an understanding of the discursive reconfiguration of
threats to Norway after the ‘clean-cut’ security situation of the cold war; when old threats
disappear, new ones must be created and upheld. In large swaths of Europe, the favorite
new target is crystallized in Islam. Europe’s age-old history of racism and colonialism
set against the backdrop of the September 11, 2001 attacks and the subsequent war on
terror, constitutes fertile soil for stirring up xenophobia and suspicion to those recently
arrived on ‘our shores’. Drawing on examples from the Norwegian press, I will attempt
to show that the processes described by the Copenhagen school as Securitization is both
passively at work as well as actively employed in the Norwegian political debate.
In chapter 4, a closer look will taken at different conceptions of Norwegianness and
the ways in which these are presented in the public discourse on immigration. Whereas
certain symbolic markers of national identity—particularly the bunad (Norwegian folk
costumes) are given mention, the main focus is directed to more ‘ethereal’ constructions
of Norwegianness, especially the normative constructions that are taken for granted as
making up the moral framework of the ‘good Norwegian’ in response to matters as diverse
as parenting, tolerance towards religion, sexuality and ‘foreign culture’, views on the
xi
egalitarian society and racism. Though several idiosyncrasies surface as more or less
particular to Norwegianness, it is nevertheless obvious that the majority of the values
expressed as normative presumptions of thinking, meaning and doing the right thing are
not at all found purely within a Norwegian cultural sphere, but are in fact common to a
European, Western (or even universal) Enlightenment that, tracing its historical roots to
the eighteenth century and beyond, radically informs our perception of the central tenets
of social organization. What this Enlightenment entails for the discourse on immigration
and global mobility today, is the central issue of chapter 5.
Finally, almost every section of this thesis could—and perhaps, should, for all analytic
purposes—have ended with “. . . and then Anders Behring Breivik and the July 22. attacks
changed everything.” Or did anything really change at all? The final chapter of this thesis
will try to approach the discourse on Norwegianness and exclusion as the underlying cause
of the tragedies that occurred when a self-admitted Norwegian crusader took it upon
himself to put an end to the discussion on the future of Norwegian immigration policy.
More than a mere postscript, this thesis submits in its conclusion that in view of the
climate of rising xenophobia and escalating conflicts of ideology, coupled with the ongoing
legitimization of a discourse on ‘our’ national, cultural security, the July 22. attacks were
not only a collapse of a civilized discussion on policy, nor a mere atrocity carried out by
a deranged individual external to the society in which he was reared. The perpetrator
was a true child of contemporary Norway, and an inevitable conclusion to decades of
institutionalized and internalized racism, hate speech and an ongoing construction of
the ideology of national and cultural superiority—it was the empirical conclusion to a
conceptual discussion in which human decency is faltering.
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1Introduction
The power of the status quo puts up the fac¸ades into which our consciousness
crashes. It must seek to crash through them. . . . Where the thought transcends
the bonds it tied in resistance—there is its freedom. Freedom follows the
subject’s urge to express itself. The need to lend a voice to suffering is a
condition of all truth. For suffering is objectivity that weighs upon the subject;
its most subjective experience, its expression, is objectively conveyed.
—Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics
This thesis is a fundamentally normative text. It claims that ethnic or racial discrimina-
tion is bad, that racism is bad, that nationalism, and needless fear-mongering on behalf
of the nation, is bad. Any suffering, as the direct result of discrimination on grounds
of racist or cultural exclusivist notions of superiority, is morally despicable, ethically in-
defensible, and normatively wrong. If you, the reader, do not subscribe to these moral
presuppositions, you should probably not read any further. Indeed, it would be a wholly
ridiculous undertaking to argue for any of the overarching propositions and conclusions
that are to come later in this text, if the wish to minimize human suffering is not some-
thing you have an immediate affinity towards. Similarly, if you subscribe to any notion
of necessary demarcation between races, cultures or nations, or to the infallibility of the
free market in regulating global mobility of peoples and capital, you will not find this
text particularly agreeable to your point of view.
In all fairness, you will probably not have any interest in this text unless you subscribe
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to a long list of ethical, moral and even ideological tenets that is somewhat endemic to
the often caricatured left-leaning, liberal, politically correct intelligentsia. Then again,
no one will force you to read further if you do not.
Most likely, this thesis brings little new to the table. Surely, the number of people
who could express the ideas proposed in this text in clearer, more eloquent prose is in the
thousands. In reality, it has already been done: the preexisting mountain of literature
on the different themes that are attempted synthesized in this text, is likely superior in
all cases. What little insight this thesis may offer, consists solely by the synthesis of
the distinctive parts outlined in the foreword; namely the discursively created notion,
and subsequently challenged security, of Norwegianness as part of a European tradition
of Enlightenment thought. Constituting a tapestry of these different topics, this text is
not a systematic argument along the lines of a predetermined plan—nor is it intended
to be. If anything, it should be read as a series of conceptual and theoretical ideas and
interventions concerning the Norwegian condition, which should, ideally, shed mutual
light upon each other. As such, merely flipping to the last pages in order to grasp
an attempted conclusion, is not recommended: What conclusions are made, are few,
scattered, and merely tentative.
On Language, Reality and Subjectivity
Why study language? Who cares? Should not students of migration address more em-
pirical cases, where a more scient-ist, empirically based reasoning could help solve ‘real’
or more immediately tangible problems of integration?
Is this not the wrong question? Is not language an absolute precondition for power,
while simultaneously being power’s clearest expression? If we are not to study power,
then what are we to study? The dis-attached consequences of its exertion: suffering as
bare condition, with no causality or narrative?
It is, fundamentally, a necessary precondition for the outlook, method and composition
of this thesis to focus on human suffering. Not only subjective suffering in itself, but
suffering as consequence of abuse of power. And power, in this instance, is exerted
through, and is in itself, language.
To give a short exemplification in the case of Norway: The different denominations
characterizing irregular immigrants in Norwegian discourse, have taken on Orwellian
proportions: Where a range of formerly adopted terms, such as “undocumented asy-
lum seekers”, “paper-less” and their more belligerent counterparts “unjustified asylum
seekers” and “illegal immigrants”, had—for a time—been overtaken by the term “un-
returnables”, the latest addition to Norwegian new-speak (coined by a state secretary in
the Ministry of Justice, who repeatedly and shamelessly credits himself for doing so), is
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“return-deniers”.1 Seemingly, where the sans-papiers and no person is illegal campaigns
have managed to discredit some terms,2 there is no end to the imaginative ways in which
blame, criminal intent, or active, malignant agency in ‘making oneself difficult’ can be
ascribed to asylum seekers and immigrants.
Language matters, as it beyond mere euphemisms forms the conceptual matrix in
which reality is interpreted. And while language is always fiercely contested, it is a contest
in which the weaker part always loses out. Addressing this lopsidedness of discursive
power to create truth is an imperative that academia should never take lightly.
This is the core of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA): to address the un-even distri-
bution of language/power and its application in creating a political climate within which
illegitimate actions are committed without neither identification nor criticism. Beyond
use of discursive capital, CDA attempts to elucidate and criticize abuse of power.3
Perhaps the most obscene result of the current political climate in Norway, is the hor-
rendously denigrating treatment of irregular migrants, and in particular, their children.
Symptomatically, it is not the children who are irregular—they are merely the children
of adults who are denied asylum, children who are treated as a kind of unfortunate lug-
gage belonging to their parents, somehow not deemed deserving of a judicial treatment
of their own. Examples of emphatically inhuman treatment of these children abound;
born in institutions far outside of Norwegian cities (out of sight, out of mind), children
are raised under conditions of fear and insecurity in a society that enjoys applauding
itself as a standard-bearer of democracy, peace and humanistic values. Years later, these
same children—now speaking Norwegian, eating Norwegian, behaving Norwegian, being
Norwegian—are, according to governmental jargon, “returned” to their country of origin
under force (what country of origin? Basic linguistics and grammar would insist that
these children are deported, not returning to a place they have never visited). As 10
year-old Palestinian refugee Neda Ibrahim said recently, having spent 9 years of her life
in a Norwegian asylum reception center, fearing forced deportation her entire conscious
life: “I actually like living in Norway, it’s Norway that doesn’t like me.”4
These individual stories of ruined childhoods amount to nothing less than a systemic
evil. Politics, however, dictate that the ruling Labor Party can hardly afford to back
down on their “firm but fair” policy, as it would likely lead to a loss at the polls—in fact,
in the latest round of pointing fingers, the normally immigration-critical Progress Party
saw their chance to represent popular opinion in condemning the situation of irregular
1. Morgenbladet.no, “Kampen om asylet,” February 16, 2012.
2. For an overview, see Teresa Hayter, Open Borders: The Case Against Immigration Controls, 2nd ed.
(London: Pluto Press, 2004), 134–48.
3. For a general overview of Critical Discourse Analysis, see Teun A. van Dijk, Discourse & Power
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Norman Fairclough, Media Discourse (London: E. Arnold,
1995); Norman Fairclough, Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language (London: Long-
man, 2010).
4. NRK.no, “Det er vi som har bestemt at det skal være slik,” March 4, 2012.
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asylum seeker’s children, arguing for a full re-evaluation of their individual cases.5 Tables
turn quickly when polls dictate policy.
What this thesis is really all about
The core of this thesis is one of deconstructing the notion of objective threats. The idea
that Norway—and more specifically, that which is Norwegian—is under threat by an
unwanted dilution of its culture by immigrants carrying with them customs, values and
perspectives not commensurable with Norwegianness, is not particular to Norway: the
same jargon and discourse of ‘us’ and ‘them’ is found throughout Europe, fueled and
sustained by the rise of right-wing populists in countries such as France, Britain, Sweden
and Denmark – as well as in Central and Eastern Europe. Following Barry Buzan and Ole
Wæver from the Copenhagen School, I intend to argue that the above threat – whether or
not, to some degree, it is partly ‘realistic’ or not – is wholly constructed, thus demanding
the critical analysis which, unfortunately, it so far seems to be successfully eluding in the
public imagination.6
Two different perspectives will form the point of departure for my thesis. Firstly, that
threats are not necessarily objective things. According to securitization theory, differ-
ent issues are at regular intervals securitized and de-securitized ; that is, framed within
a “logics of survival” as threats, and, if accepted by an audience as legitimate, moved
into the political realm of security policy, thus acquiring fundamental importance and
subsequently all that follows with such a framing, be it increased funding or heightened
legitimacy.7 Can securitization as an analytic concept help elucidate some of the processes
that cause this fear and worry on behalf of ‘that which is Norwegian’? Secondly, what
is being threatened, the object of the perceived threats, is neither clearly defined, nor
particularly susceptible to definition in itself. Hence, ’that-which-is-Norwegian – Nor-
wegianness – will have to be elucidated beyond mere pin-pointing of different markers
of national cultural identity, i.e. folk costumes, culinary traditions and idiosyncratic
mannerisms, or particular constructions of ‘our’ values.8
The synthesis of the two topical perspectives above will as such be to analyze the
securitization of cultural threats to Norwegianness, and, if possible, how this has increas-
ingly become a framework in which legitimate accusations of racism and xenophobia are
5. Dagsavisen.no, “Frp vil gi asylbarna ny sjanse,” March 7, 2012.
6. See, in particular, Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework
for Analysis (Boulder, CA: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998); Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan, and Morten
Kelstrup, Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe, in collab. with Pierre Lemaitre
(London: Pinter Publishers, 1993).
7. Jef Huysmans, The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU, The New Inter-
national Relations (London: Routledge, 2006), xi–xiv.
8. Which is not to say that none of these are of importance in expressing identity, nor that they do
not carry immense weight in the general perception as ‘glue’ innate to our ‘imagined community.’
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bereaved of legitimacy, as the discourse of cultural incompatibility is increasingly adopted
by even moderate, social-democratic actors on the political plane.
Destroying Norwegian Culture
The destruction of the Norwegian ‘culture’ may come to pass. Imagining a future where
not everyone eats brown goat’s cheese and goes skiing from the age of four wearing
traditional folk costumes may seem difficult for some Norwegians, yet it remains a likely
future. That, say, the privileged position of the Norwegian Lutheran State Church may
be lost, is not an unlikely scenario. A plethora of markers of Norwegianness will surely
disappear, or be reforged—many new ones will emerge. Norwegian culture will be forced
to change. The question then, is; So what?
Claiming that the current ‘culture’ of Norway—as real as it may or may not be—
should be perpetuated into eternity, comprises a failure on the conceptual level: In an
increasingly globalized world, cultural hybridization and pluralism is the only national
culture that is sustainable in the long run. A fully static, ‘pure’ culture is not only
impossible, it is wholly undesirable, as the few contemporary and historical occurrences
of such (e.g. Nazi Germany and North Korea) show all too clearly. As Kwame Anthony
Appiah wrote in the New York Times Magazine, “cultures are made of continuities and
changes, and the identity of a society can survive through these changes. Societies without
change aren’t authentic; they’re just dead.”9
It is important to not overly misconstrue the goal of this thesis, or give the reader
false hopes that a complete reconfiguration of national culture will be undertaken within
the text at hand. Whereas certain elements of the Norwegian public debate tend to look
at all attempts of ‘deconstruction’ as a literal disassembling and scrapping of all-that-is-
Norwegian, it is important to reiterate that Norway is a wonderful place to live for the
absolute majority of its inhabitants. Norway is, as countries go, a splendid one; as rich
in both oil and spectacular nature as it is peaceful and egalitarian. A functioning welfare
society, with public health care, free education and little to no corruption or overt power
abuse, Norway is a haven in an otherwise often troubled world. This is a point not lost
on Norwegians, as it is clearly not lost on those who attempt to come here.
Whereas most reasoning on behalf of immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers with
regards to final destination of a migratory process tend to follow most economic “laws”
of migration, i.e. push factors followed by chance, existing networks of family in destina-
tion society, and other goals common to human agency, many still make a rudimentary
evaluation of potential destinations. When conducting interviews with ‘potential asylum
seekers’ from Iraq, Eritrea and Chechnya, Jan-Paul Brekke and Monica Five Aarset found
that, beyond economic and family oriented motives, Norway ‘won out’ as final destination
9. Kwame A. Appiah, “The Case for Contamination,” New York Times Magazine, January 1, 2006.
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due to its reputation.10 Though such a reputation is a fickle thing, altering rapidly with
changes in immigration policy, Norway’s reputation is still one of a peaceful nation with
high regard of human rights and a fair chance of making a living.
As such, the solution to ending immigration into Norway is presented to us on a silver
plate: All that Norwegians have to do, is to shape Norway into an unsafe and violent
society, destroy the Norwegian welfare state and the rule of law and let corruption thrive
unchecked—and immigrants will stop coming. When this is not immediately considered
an option, we are left with a clear and unmistakable double standard: Norwegians com-
pletely understand the immigrants’ motives for coming here, but the security of an ethnic,
homogeneous culture is more important than alleviating the suffering of fellow humans
who are not born with a Norwegian passport.
Ju¨rgen Habermas writes on the necessary demarcation between political culture and
‘culture’ as such, that
The democratic right of self-determination includes, of course, the right to
preserve one’s own political culture, which includes the concrete context of
citizen’s rights, though it does not include the self-assertion of a privileged
cultural life form.11
Though this is not the place for a prolonged and spirited defense of neither constitu-
tional patriotism nor exceptionally liberal multiculturalism in an extended interpretation
towards a-culturalism, it is my submission that Norwegians are hard pressed to find
nation-oriented ways out of a constricted, exclusive definition of Norwegianness, besides
a complete reconfiguration of the premises for national identity, discarding ‘culture’ all
together as the normative foundation for either national unity or particularism.
10. Jan-Paul Brekke and Monica Five Aarset, Why Norway?: Understanding Asylum Destina-
tions, 2009:12, ISF-Rapport (Oslo: Institute for Social Research, 2009).
11. Ju¨rgen Habermas, “The Entwinement of Myth and Enlightenment: Horkheimer and Adorno,” in
The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures, trans. Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: Polity
Press, 1987), 17.
2Preliminary Notes on Theory
Intellectual honesty is the quality that the public in free countries always has
expected of historians; much more than that it does not expect, nor often get.
—Samuel E. Morison, The Faith of an Historian
Ours is a world constituted by nation states. Pesky migrants threaten to destroy us all
through subverting the national order of things. The sacred culture of the primordial
nation is under siege by religious fanatics threatening to lay our culture to waste, with
the assistance of the liberal multiculturalist and cultural marxist elites, who have misled
the people into a state where most no longer can identify the cultural betrayal—or so
some will have us believe.
Nationalism, however, is not a problem associated with far right conspiracy theorists
exclusively. Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick-Schiller conceives the notion of “method-
ological nationalism” as a term denoting the nation state as the conceptual starting point
for many theoretizations of the social sciences, particularly problematic within the field
of globalization theory.12
The social sciences, when dealing with the problem of the nation state, risk reproduc-
ing the very discourses they attempt to overcome: Obviously, any thesis delving into the
subject matter of national culture and ‘external’ threats—from a case-oriented, national
12. Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick-Schiller, “Methodological Nationalism and the Study of Migra-
tion,” European Journal of Sociology 43 (02 2002): 217–240.
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vantage point, i.e. Norwegianness—stands in danger of succumbing to methodological
nationalism; the text at hand is in this regard to be viewed as the proverbial bull in the
china shop.
Whereas Wimmer and Glick-Schiller specifically targets the liberal and social sciences
with their criticism (hence, the ‘methodological’ prefix), the remaining ‘nationalism’ as
explained by their conceptualization, is perhaps telling towards an understanding of the
fundamental role of the national in all facets of human life; in business, politics, identity
formation etc. ad infinitum. In one way, Wimmer and Glick-Schiller take an implicitly
defeatist stand; ‘Science—and by extension its practitioners—should stop being influ-
enced by the same trifle misapprehensions of nationality held by the majority of the
world’s inhabitants.’ Indeed, whereas the impressive production of literature critical to
the primacy of ‘the national’ persist in hailing the dawn of the transnational, most people
persist in their seemingly irrational faith in their homelands, and in the sanctity of their
borders and boundaries.
It should be expressively noted here that I consider it to be a fundamental truth
that national border controls, the international passport institution and the obsessive
surveilllance of borders, are wholly modern constructions. This constitutes an implicit
presupposition that is hardly ever questioned or methodically challenged. While this
thesis attempts to adress some of the blatant inconsistencies proposed by contemporary
agents of nationalism, it will not, unfortunately, synthesize the criticisms it raises to pro-
duce a radically internationalist alternative to the nationalist fallacy: As such, I commit
the same sin of omission with eyes open—this paper will remain an ad-hoc refusion of
ground vis-a-vis the most common expressions of the national thinking.
Studying Norwegianness as Norwegian
The numerous pitfalls in studying the national understood as culture, not to mention one’s
own culture, are too many to account for here. Ever since Herder, culture has been a term
of controversy, and after the grueling consequences of European romantic nationalism
it has been criticized by theorists in all walks of science: Yet (to mangle Adorno)—
even after the holocaust— culture remains a central concept in social science and the
humanities. Those attempting to study one’s own culture, Lila Abu-Lughod observes,
are prone to slide into subjectivity, having problems gaining enough distance: However,
though Abu-Lughod claims that culture as a concept contains an inordinate degree of
bound- edness, homogeneity, coherence, and unwanted stability, many anthropologists
and social theorists still regard culture as a fruitful concept to be reckoned with.13
13. Cf. Lila Abu-Lughod, “Writing Against Culture,” in Feminist Anthropology: A Reader, ed. Ellen
Lewin (1991; Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 153–169; Christoph Brumann et al., “Writing
for Culture: Why a Successful Concept Should Not be Discarded,” Current Anthropology 40 (S1 1999):
S1–S27.
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Viewing culture more or less as a Durkheimian social fact, it is the “cohesive behavior”
that occurs wherever people gather in groups, be it physical proximity or virtual reality.
As Arjun Appadurai observes, Culturalism is the conscious realization of self-identity
through af- firmation of cultural differences.Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cul-
tural Dimensions of Globalization (Minneapolis, MI: University of Minnesota Press, 1996),
147 Though such culturalism can lead to wholly negative notions of primordialism and
national supremacy, racism and hate, it also enables a hermeneutic twist of the role of the
embedded observer. One can be explicitly aware of one’s self-through-difference in binary
relation to the other, yet while conducting research in one’s own culture be conscious of
one’s self-as-member, not only through affirmation through social practices, but in ob-
serving and conceptualizing cultural expressions through the lens of situated knowledge
that is in accordance with the actors interpretations of their own actions.
On Discourse
What is discourse? According to the Oxford Dictionary, discourse, stemming from the
Latin discursus (‘running to and fro, conversation, discourse’) is “a spoken or written
treatment of a subject, in which it is handled or discussed at length; a dissertation,
treatise, homily, sermon, or the like.”14 The implicit biformity of the term should not
go unheeded; whereas a sermon could certainly be held without a congregation, or a
dissertation never read—they are incumbent upon an audience, whether this audience
partakes in the discourse or not.
As such, writing a thesis on discourse is a kind of meta-undertaking: while addressing
the contemporary discourse on a subject, this thesis will at the same time become a part
of the discourse it seeks to address.
The Critical in ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’ is—in simplified terms—the addition of
a normative point of view on Discourse Analysis: Where discourse analysis is taken to
be understood as the analysis of power in written or spoken communication, Critical
discourse analysis identifies—and inherently argues against—abuse of this power. Ad-
mittedly, this calls for some clarification on behalf of the analyzer.
First and foremost, all notions of a positivist approach to science, as a neutral under-
taking resulting in the uncovering of objective truths will have to be dropped: in fact,
CDA is the study of conflicting truths. This is not the same as accepting the proverbial
high-school tenet of relativism, that “everyone is entitled to their own opinion!” Everyone
is not entitled to their opinions, especially not so when these opinions are unfounded,
irrational—or even abusive. Whether as popular opinion as the basis for political cre-
ation of policy, or in a deeper, Foucauldian sense, opinions—language—shape the world
we all live in. Hence, a modicum of care in the forging and application of ones sentiments
14. Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. “discourse.”
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should ideally be considered a civil duty for all.
Decency and Tolerance
Anniken Hagelund suggests in her doctoral thesis on Norwegian political discourse that
the Norwegian debate on immigration is one revolving around the concept of decency.15
Two particularly interesting motives are addressed: Firstly, that the Norwegian immigra-
tion debate is inherently moral: Racism and Xenophobia is normatively bad and a moral
problem that needs to be combated. However, concrete examples of racism are hard to
establish, that is, racism is universally designated immoral and in extension impossible to
define without explicitly questioning the morality of the entire society for allowing such
displays in the first place.
Pointing out that a sentiment or action is racist, is thus a road few will endeavor
to travel. Not only is allegations of racism impossible to live with for anyone being
labeled as such; it is considered ‘bad taste’ to even insinuate racism as explanans for any
particular opinion or political act, as it is deemed the ultimate character assassination.16
Hagelund here builds on Ernesto Laclau’s notion of the constitutive outside, that which
through its explicit expulsion from the communal consensus, from the hegemonic totality,
constitutes the necessary difference for the ‘rest of us’ to agree wholeheartedly on our
own particularity: the constitutive outside renders us all uniquely alike, equivalent in our
condemnation of the outside.17
Secondly, Hagelund argues that within Norwegian Politics this constitutive outside is
embodied by the Progress Party, i.e. “the racists”.18 Not only is the Progress Party the
object from which all other mainstream political parties ceaselessly attempts to distin-
guish themselves from—and in opposition to, it is also a position that serves the Progress
Party themselves quite well: Where others have to argue for and defend unpopular deci-
sions (cutting funding for schools vs. hospitals), the Progress Party are able to criticize
any fragment of the status quo from a less pragmatic point of view. Where other parties
need argue the decent solution to a moral or political problem, the Progress Party are,
to a certain degree, able to undercut the political discourse.
In De cive, Thomas Hobbes contrasts human society’s decency with the slovenliness
of nature: Whereas the human condition in nature is one of a beast’s, civil society enables
man to ascend to a higher level, abandoning ”the dominion of passions” for a ”dominion
15. Anniken Hagelund, The Importance of Being Decent: Political Discourse on Immigration in Norway
1970-2002 (Oslo: Unipax, 2003).
16. See Teun A. van Dijk, “Discourse and the Denial of Racism,” Discourse & Society 3 (1 1992): 89–90.
17. Ernesto Laclau, On Populist Reason (London: Verso, 2007), 69–71; Ernesto Laclau, Emancipa-
tion(s) (London: Verso, 2007), 19–35, passim.
18. Anniken Hagelund, “A Matter of Decency? The Progress Party in Norwegian Immigration Politics,”
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 29 (1 2003): 47–65.
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of reason.”19 In his argument, Hobbes illustrates the dichotomy of a moral choice needed
in civil society: decency is not inherent in man’s nature, but is something we have to
strive to attain. At the same time, as I have already hinted at, decency entails a given
negative, a problem that has a decent solution.
Decency presupposes that a given problem has a solution that— though not ideal—
may resolve inherent conflicts in the best possible way, through a ‘moral compromise’
so to say. The concept of tolerance is closely connected: Amy Gutmann argues in the
introduction to Charles Taylor’s Multiculturalism that whereas respect entails a certain
understanding of a position “as reflecting a moral point of view,” that is, serious moral
disagreements where both parts can take for granted that the opponent is arguing without
ulterior motives, “. . . toleration extends to the widest range of views, so long as they stop
short of threats and other direct and discernible harms to individuals.”20 However, it is
hardly tolerant to accept opinions one agrees with: as with decency, tolerance need only
be applied when confronted with a given negative, or as Ju¨rgen Habermas puts it; “We
need to show tolerance only towards worldviews we consider wrong and habits we do not
appreciate.”21
Tolerance, however, is not a sufficient precondition for neither societal justice for the
Other nor the successful integration of immigrants. Zygmunt Bauman touches on this in
Postmodernity and Its Discontents : Tolerance is necessary, but not enough;
By itself, the democratic regime does not promote (let alone guarantee) the
transformation of tolerance into solidarity— that is, the recognition of other
people’s misery and sufferings as one’s own responsibility, and the alleviation
and eventually the removal of misery as one’s own task. More often than not,
given the present shape of political mechanism, democratic regimes translate
tolerance as callousness and indifference.22
As such, tolerance for the Other far too easily gives credence to passive multicultural
‘laissez-faire’ policies, arguing that an intervention into the material inequalities that dic-
tate living conditions of immigrants, would be ‘unfair’, both to the indigenous population
as well as to the immigrants themselves. Tolerance—as Wendy Brown puts it— regulates
aversion, checking “an attitude or condition of disapproval, disdain, or revulsion with
a particular kind of overcoming”: it is a process of patting our own backs despite our
19. Thomas Hobbes, De Cive: The English Version Entitled, in the First Edition, Philosophicall Rudi-
ments Concerning Government and Society, ed. Howard Warrender (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983),
129–131.
20. Amy Gutmann, “Introduction,” in Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, by
Charles Taylor, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 22, emphasis
mine.
21. Ju¨rgen Habermas, “What is Meant by a ‘Post-Secular Society’?: A Discussion on Islam in Europe,”
in Europe: The Faltering Project, ed. Ju¨rgen Habermas, trans. Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge: Polity, 2009),
69.
22. Zygmunt Bauman, Postmodernity and Its Discontents (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997), 63.
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prejudices, applauding our capability not to openly discriminate those we consider in the
wrong:
Despite its pacific demeanor, tolerance is an internally unharmonious term,
blending together goodness, capaciousness, and conciliation with discomfort,
judgment, and aversion. Like patience, tolerance is necessitated by something
one would prefer did not exist.23
Multiculturalism
Certainly, the critics of Islam are right: Islam—as a religion—is reactionary, backwards
and outdated. It is, when looking at its central tenets of misogynist patriarchy and
glorification of violence, detrimental to the human condition and thus inherently immoral.
On this, I, as very nearly all other western communists or liberals, agnostics or atheists,
agree wholeheartedly.
It is my submission that multiculturalism needs be understood as an inherently prag-
matic approach: it is a point of view born out of accepting the ‘facts on the ground’ (to
put the situation in military terms); that geographical Europe is (and has always been)
the home of more than the French, the British, the Germans, the Czechs or even the
Basque: it is also the territory where millions of Roma, Jews, Sami, Arabs, Africans and
Muslims live out their daily lives and dreams. Failing to comprehend the necessity to
incorporate these groups into a political European community, is not merely a theoretical,
academic or political travesty—it is a betrayal of humanity itself.
I can see no other mode of analysis than a careful conceptual and deliberative ap-
proach to discourse analysis as fitting in addressing the claims of moral and civilizational
supremacy as shown by monocultural and fundamentalist enlightenment critics of Islam
and Muslims.
The notion of Europe under siege by an external threat—be it military, civilizational,
cultural or religious—is, by a range of ‘immigration skeptics’, ‘Islam critics’ and right
wing extremists, coupled with the idea of the internal traitors. Every European coun-
try’s respective multiculturalists, liberalists, academic elite, and socialists are considered
as knowingly creating policies and enabling a situation that in the long (or as some argue,
not so long) run will lead to a cultural and ethnic disaster where European or national
cultures, and even the indigenous populace of Europe itself will be marginalized, sup-
pressed and ultimately destroyed, by the ever so rapidly multiplying immigrants. This
fear-mongering is detrimental to our collective safety as a democratic political culture,
and a slippery slope to a situation in which our neighbor may at any time be construed
23. Wendy Brown, Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2008).
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as a personified threat to the well-being of our society. Such threats, historically, tend to
dealt with harshly.
14
3Securitization
AWAKE! FEAR! FIRE! FOES! AWAKE!
FEAR! FIRE! FOES!
AWAKE! AWAKE!
–J.R.R. Tolkien, “The Lord of the Rings”
The Rise and Fall of an Extremist Nobody
On February 2 2010, Dagbladet published an article claiming that the homepage of
the Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) were effectively ‘linking’ to drawn images
on the internet depicting the prophet Muhammad as a pig.24 In addition, Dagbladet
chose to print a photograph of a man, taken from a position behind him, looking at
a computer screen with the provocative image itself—at its front page. Aggravated by
this, an estimated two and a half thousand Norwegian Muslims gathered in Oslo to
demonstrate their disapproval. During his speech at this demonstration, a young man
named Mohyeldeen Mohammad claimed that
If this is allowed to continue, it will eventually be too late. Then we will get
a September 11th and June 7th on Norwegian soil. This is not a threat, but
24. Dagbladet.no, “Hysj-politiet lenker til sider som framstiller profeten som en gris,” February 3, 2010.
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a warning.25
This immediately led to a moral panic in the Norwegian media, quickly deciding that this
was a threat, despite the explicit insurance that it was not, and immediate condemnation
ensued from government officials, politicians, the moderate Islamic Counsel in Norway
and other moderate Muslims. The left-wing newspaper Klassekampen managed to get
an interview with Mohammad, in which he was asked a long range of relatively open
questions. He answered the questions with zeal and propagated opinions which to most
Norwegians would indeed seem extreme, and when asked if he supported stoning to death
of homosexuals as a form of punishment, responded that “as far as I know that person
was gay, and if so, that is the punishment he deserves.”26 Then Dagbladet ran an article
where what could be mustered of the political elite and moderate Muslims voiced their
unequivocal condemnation of such opinions under the heading “– It is sickening.”27 A
week later, a demonstration was held in the hometown of Mohammad—opposing his
opinions—by moderate muslims.28
Mohyeldeen Mohammad—as the raving Islamic fundamentalist he most assuredly is—
was portrayed as an immediate threat to the well-being of Norway and its inhabitants, and
most importantly as representing a culture that is incommensurable with Norwegianness.
Securitization: The Concept
Threats—and from them, derived fear—fosters action, or rather, reaction. Instilling fear
in the public in order to capitalize on a situation where support, legitimacy or funding is
needed, say in case of impending war, is an age-old operation; it is fundamental to the
workings of the state. The police, representing the state’s monopoly on violence, could
not exist if not for peoples fear for their livelihood, property or health. Wars would be
unthinkable, if not for the fear for one’s survival in the face of a threatening external
force.
Denial of asylum to persecuted people, redirecting over-crowded boats filled with
refugees to ‘where they came from’, detaining ‘illegal immigrants’ without trials, and
arresting naturalized members of local communities in the dark of the night in order to
return them to oppressive regimes or war zones, would lead to riots and uproar—if not
for the fear of ‘our’ borders being overrun, ‘our’ countries flooded, ‘our’ culture destroyed.
Fear makes the world go ’round.
Threats are not objective things. Securitization, understood as the elevation of issues
of lesser, immediate political importance to the level of politics of security, creates a
25. NRK.no, “Advarte mot norsk 11. september,” February 12, 2010.
26. Klassekampen.no, “– Homofile fortjener dødsstraff,” February 16, 2010, “– Etter det jeg kjenner til
var den personen homofil, og det er den straffen han da fortjener.”
27. Dagbladet.no, “– Det er kvalmende,” February 17, 2010.
28. Dagbladet.no, “– Det muslimske samfunnet støtter oss, men vil ikke delta n˚a,” February 22, 2010.
Securitization 17
legitimacy of policy where there was not necessarily any from before. As Buzan, Wæver
and Wilde write in their seminal Security: a New Framework for Analysis, “‘Security’
is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the
issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. Securitization can thus be
seen as a more extreme version of politicization.”29
A thoroughly constructivist approach, securitization builds upon Foucauldian dis-
course analysis, in turn characterized by its focus upon discursive practices as constructing
power relations and knowledge, not merely mirroring the reality as perceived. This view
of discourse as formative of truth is a precondition to understand the concept of securiti-
zation: Securitization is discourse, from the presentation of something as a threat—the
‘securitizing move’—to the audience’s acceptance of the threat presented as a valid con-
cern.30
In reference to a case analysis, Barry Buzan explicitly argues for discourse analysis
as applied method in uncovering securitization:
The obvious method is discourse analysis, since we are interested in when
and how something is established by whom as a security threat. The defining
criterion of security is textual: a specific rhetorical structure that has to be
located in discourse.31
Foucault presented the task of analyzing discourse as consisting of “. . . not [only]
treating discourses as groups of signs, (signifying elements referring to contents or repre-
sentations) but as practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak.”32
Viewing discourse as formative of reality, not only mirroring it, raises implications for the
use of language in media: publicly repeating ‘untruths’ or normative presuppositions as
purely descriptive of a perceived reality, may in turn—if repeated often enough—create
the very reality which was argued for. As Foucault writes in one of his 1976 lectures at
the Colle`ge de France,
There can be no possible exercise of power without a certain economy of
discourses of truth which operates through and on the basis of this association.
We are subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot
exercise power except through the production of truth.33
This view of discourse as formative of truth is a precondition to understand the concept
of securitization. Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde argues for such a dynamic in their book:
29. Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, Security , 23.
30. Ibid., 25.
31. Ibid., 176.
32. Michel Foucault, Archaeology of Knowledge (1969; London: Routledge Classics, 2002), 54.
33. Michel Foucault, “Two Lectures,” (second lecture, January 14, 1972), in Power/Knowledge: Selected
Interviews and Other Writings, 1972–1977, ed. Colin Gordon, trans. Kate Soper (New York: Pantheon
Books, 1980), 93.
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Securitization can be studied directly; it does not need indicators. The
way to study securitization is to study discourse and political constellations:
When does an argument with this particular rhetorical and semiotic structure
achieve sufficient effect to make an audience tolerate violations of rules that
would otherwise have to be obeyed?34
Securitization: The Technique
Most importantly, from my vantage point of attempting to examine the discourse on
immigration and Norwegian identity, Jef Huysmans argues towards an understanding of
the discourse of security as a premeditated practice: the securitizing move relies on the
instigation of fear and subsequent accumulation and ‘cashing in’ of this fear for political
gain; securitization is not merely an analytical lens through which a further understanding
of un-intended shifts of discourse and power can be established, but also—and more
disturbingly—“a political technique of framing policy questions in logics of survival with
a capacity to mobilize politics of fear in which social relations are structured on the basis
of distrust.”35 Securitization is discourse applied, located somewhere between politics and
war on Clausewitz’s continuum.
The real-life application of a ‘technique’ tends to be premeditated, it is willed. In
its ultimate consequence, the securitization of the forwarded or perceived threat (e.g.
immigration) can enable governments to suspend normal political functions and rights
in order to protect the safety of its citizens; extraordinary threats take extraordinary
measures—the most telling exemplification of which is the American ‘war on terror’. As
Teun van Dijk writes, it hardly needs further analysis to argue that “[. . . ] terrorism serves
Bush, his party, the Pentagon budget, the curtailment of civil liberties and especially the
businesses involved in war and security.”36 David Harvey comments on this dynamic
approach to security, in the case of the now clearly unfounded securitization of the ‘Iraq-
problem’; when no longer feasibly sustained as a threat, the Iraq invasion was instead
turned into a benevolent campaign for freedom; “When all other reasons for engaging in
a pre-emptive war against Iraq was proven wanting, the president appealed to the idea
that the freedom conferred on Iraq was in and of itself an adequate justification for the
war. The Iraqis were free, and that was all that really mattered.”37
The war on terror has, in many areas, led to what Giorgio Agamben calls the state
of permanent exception: In the transitional phase from democracy towards totalitarian-
ism, exceptional laws are passed that reorganize contemporary balances of power—all
in the name of security and safety; after a while, the exceptions become universal and
34. Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, Security , 25.
35. Huysmans, The Politics of Insecurity , xi–xii.
36. Dijk, Discourse & Power , 204.
37. David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 6.
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permanent.38 Saving lives and protecting potential civilian victims from terrorists’ harm
has never been at the core of security (it would of course be a nearly impossible under-
taking); security is not only an expression of power, it helps create legitimacy of power
as well. When the citizens of the sovereign submit to the pat-downs and body-scans at
airports, they are confessing their faith in, and submission to, the state. When directives
are introduced that call for the constant surveillance of all electronic communication be-
tween law-abiding people—just in case—they are accepted in recognition of the absolute
authority of the state.
As Slavoj Zˇizˇek comments on Agamben’s proposal in the face of the immigrant
Other—or in Zˇizˇek’s terms, the Neighbor—the state of exception is already upon us.
The incomprehensible magnitude of failure of the European morality in addressing the
flow of immigration across the Mediterranean sea, is evident in a never-ending string of
grotesque news reports. The Italian state of emergency that was proclaimed nation-wide
in 2008 to cope with the illegal human beings crossing the sea, is but another example of
the constant extensions of the limits of power.39
As Foucault has argued, the portrayed focus on the security of the population, is but
another expression of the state’s exertion of control and discipline—biopolitics, or bio-
power: Symptomatically of modernity’s ‘governmental rationality’, the inclusion of ever
new areas of control is perhaps precisely the very reason for the state’s survival, “since it
is the tactics of government that allow the continual definition of what should or should
not fall within the state’s domain, what is public and what private, what is and is not
within the state’s competence, and so on.”40 In the past, it was the states prerogative to
protect its citizen’s genes: Now, it upholds its culture.
Securing Culture
Where once the state stood as guarantor for the biological safety of its inhabitants, the
state has transformed into the patron of its own cultural particularity. Where the biopol-
itics of old days with eugenics and skull-measurements is discredited beyond repossession,
culture as the target of fearful paper-tigers is the new show in town. As in the case of
the ‘reasonably racist’ treatment of the desperate people attempting to reach the Italian
shores of Europe, it still represents “a clear passage from direct barbarism to Berlusconian
barbarism with a human face.”41
In his book The New Racism, Martin Barker raises an interesting point on the epis-
38. See Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 14–29, passim.
39. Slavoj Zˇizˇek, First as Tragedy, Then as Farce (London: Verso, 2009), 46–47.
40. Michel Foucault, “Lecture, February 1, 1978, Colle`ge de France,” in Security, Territory, Population:
Lectures at Colle`ge de France, 1977–1978, ed. Michel Senellart, trans. Graham Burchell (Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 109.
41. Zˇizˇek, First as Tragedy, Then as Farce, 48.
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temological short-cut of perceived fear versus its actual validity as such—the fear on
behalf of one’s ‘way of life’, or ‘culture’, is self-validating, justifying the securitization of
migration as a palpable threat:
What then do we say about a fear whose very existence justifies that policy
steps be taken to remove what is felt as threatening? [. . . ] people’s feelings
about their essential unity and individuality are so central that they are not
even just seen as by-products of the way they live together. Rather, they
constitute their way of life. If it were not for feelings of belonging, of sharing
traditions, customs, beliefs, language – in a word, culture – there would be no
society. We could not live together and cooperate. Therefore the very exis-
tence of fears about damage to the unity of the nation is proof that the unity
of the nation is threatened. The fears are self-validating. For the feelings, the
customs make up the nation for all its worth. The nation is its ‘way of life’.42
This new, self-validating ‘racism-as-culturism’ is a necessary precondition for political
manipulation of fear on behalf of one’s cultural existence. The migrant threat is first
constructed in respectable terms of cultural incommensurability, and then subsequently
securitized as a threat. When derived of its connotations to imperialist notions of race
and near history of concentration camps, xenophobia thrives when cultural incommensu-
rability can be argued publicly; it has become possible to be a “respectable racist.”43
Visual markers of foreign identity are particularly susceptible to criticism of this
‘reasonable’ sort: the appearance of hijabs in the city-scapes of Norway has certainly
stirred emotions and laid bare a range of formerly suppressed discourses on the threat of
immigration.
Criticism of respectable racism is hard to raise. Last fall, when the leader of the
Norwegian conservative party Høyre argued that certain aspects of the discourse on Islam
and Muslims are quite analogous to the way Jews were regarded in Europe before the
Holocaust, she was publicly chastised for belittling the Holocaust. Surely, no one wants
to round up all the European Muslims, put them in concentration camps and kill them?
One of the more obnoxious strategies of legitimizing strict immigration control, is
arguing for the decency of strictness. Ignoring subjective suffering, the case is made that
in order to protect immigrants from persecution, discrimination, or overtly negative an-
tipathies, immigrants need to be treated harshly for their own good. If they are treated
well, the “racists” will be offended, or even worse, scoring political points if the immi-
grants “misbehave” (as in the case with Mohyeldeen Mohammad), and more people will
direct irrational hatred towards immigrants. To limit such a development, Norway—for
domestic, political purposes—needs to show a firm hand in dealing with asylum seekers.
42. Martin Barker, The New Racism: Conservatives and the Ideology of the Tribe (Frederick, MD:
Aletheia Books, 1982), 17.
43. Maggie Ibrahim, “The Securitization of Migration: A Racial Discourse,” International Migration
43 (5 2005): 167.
Securitization 21
This is exactly the same line of argument that was prevalent among the bourgeoisie in
1930’s Europe: reasonable measures are needed to quench unreasonable hatred. Slavoj
Zˇizˇek asks:
Is not this same attitude at work in the way our governments are dealing with
the “immigrant threat”? After righteously rejecting populist racism as “un-
reasonable” and unacceptable given our democratic standards, they endorse
“reasonably” racist protective measures . . . “ . . . We don’t want to kill anyone,
we don’t want to organize any pogrom. But we also think that the best way to
hinder the always unpredictable actions of violent anti-immigration protests
is to organize reasonable anti-immigrant protection.”44
The Hijab as Threatening Extremism
In 2010, MP for the Progress Party Christian Tybring-Gjedde claimed that the Hijab is
no better than the robes of the Ku Klux Klan:
– When parents dress their children in the hijab, that is just as bad as if they
had dressed them in the robes of Ku Klux Klan to me. Surely no-one would
accept that?45
Here, Tybring-Gjedde attacks anyone who would even consider wearing a hijab, let alone
‘force it’ upon their children. Most Norwegians will loathe any sentiment considered as
remotely close to organized racism such as Ku Klux Klan, owing both to a relatively
complicated history during the second World War, and an image of self constructed as
Norwegian adherence to equality—not only as ’Norwegian egalitarianism’—but to an in-
ternationally directed understanding of ‘equality among cultures’ discursively created in
the last century. Of course, no politician would ever consider attacking children for wear-
ing a hijab, nor would Tybring-Gjedde. However, the acts of the parents are presented
as abhorrent by implying that (1) the children are uninformed of the role of the hijab as
conforming to the uniform of a particular world-view, thus also the ramifications towards
signified identity of wearing it, and (2) Islam is ‘just as bad’ as the Ku Klux Klan (that
is, racist and intolerant).
By ending it with the rhetoric remark “surely no-one would accept that”, Tybring-
Gjedde effectively renders all opposition moot; ‘anyone disagreeing with me are disagree-
ing with common sense’. Not only are opponents rhetorically denied the opportunity
of disagreeing (with the comparison of the hijab and the attire of one of the most no-
toriously violent racist groups in the world as), they are also common-sensically wrong;
by necessarily agreeing that one would not accept that children are dressed in the robes
44. Zˇizˇek, First as Tragedy, Then as Farce, 48.
45. Dagbladet.no, “Frp-politiker sammenligner hijab med Ku Klux Klan,” March 3, 2010, “– N˚ar foreldre
tar hijab p˚a barna sine, er det for meg like ille som om de skulle tatt p˚a dem Ku Klux Klan-kapper.
Ingen ville vel godtatt det”.
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of the Klan, one has to agree with Tybring-Gjedde. Once agreeing (though only in a
segment of the argument), it becomes difficult to disregard the argument in its entirety:
leading the audience to the conclusion that ‘this man is obviously not a complete idiot’.
Bridging the gap between two different statements in this way, is quite a common way
to ‘sugar the pill’. However, I suspect Tybring-Gjedde to not have any pill to sweeten;
at the time of publication the Progress Party was struggling at the polls, and was sorely
needing attention.
Norwegian Populist Progress
As, among others, Anniken Hagelund argues, the Progress Party owes their rise to popu-
larity to this modus operandi:46 Whenever threatened at the polls, they issue some more
or less ridiculous statement bluntly attacking minority groups, firstly leading to ‘outrage’
among the political elite which the Progress Party purports to be in opposition to, thus
effectively gaining popularity in the egalitarian, anti-elitist and anti-urban demographic
segment of Norway; and secondly, they gain nods of agreement among those who perceive
themselves as threatened, i.e. the self-identifying ‘common people’ of populist rhetoric.47
It should be pointed out that Christian Tybring-Gjedde is a member of parliament,
and has access to the media. His opinions, whether or not interesting in themselves,
become interesting from the vantage point of the newspaper by him being a public figure
with the (although remote, as the Progress Party are in opposition and not in government)
possibility to at least cause, though not enact, policy changes. 48 More importantly, he
has the possibility to—via the media—form public opinion on the basis of communicating
complicated matters in simple terms. Tybring-Gjedde has the ability—in a ‘worst case’
application of a Foucauldian view of discorse—to construct the political reality, and
hence perceived reality, with random utterances of antagonism. Van Dijk identifies this
prerogative of access and subsequent possibility of forming opinion— and thus exerting
power and control—as that of the ‘elites’: “the groups in society that have special power
resources,” in his Elite Discourse and Racism.49 This access to power is not shared by the
general population, and especially not so by marginalized groups such as immigrants.50
As van Dijk writes in Discourse and Power,
Differential access of majority elites and minorities to the media predictably
46. Hagelund, Importance of Being Decent .
47. See Richard Sennett, The Fall of Public Man (1977; London: Penguin, 2002), 277–82.
48. For an account of the Progress Party’s position in Norwegian politics, and especially in regards
to immigration policy, see Hagelund, “A Matter of Decency?” as well as a more exhaustive account in
Hagelund, Importance of Being Decent , 28ff.
49. Teun A. van Dijk, Elite Discourse and Racism, vol. 6, SAGE Series on Race and Ethnic Relations
(Newbury Park, CA: SAGE, 1993), 44–45.
50. This is not to say that every opinion uttered by politicians or other elites are likely to be wholesale
adopted by the general public, only that the tools to mediate this power is unequally distributed, and
that the elites’ opinions are those best known.
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results in differential access to the structure of news reports as well. Selec-
tion and prominence of news issues and topics are those stereotypical and
negative ones preferred by the white political, corporate, social or scholarly
elites and their institutions. Thus, the frequent issue of immigration will be
primarily defined as an invasion and as essentially problematic, . . . Crime,
drugs, violence and cultural deviance are other preferred issues of ‘ethnic’
news coverage.51
Furthermore, it should be pointed out that immigrants are also less quoted than ethnic
majority speaker, and that if they are quoted at all, this is as either (1) ridiculous, zealot
extremists, or (2) moderate spokespersons who support the majority view of ethnic Nor-
wegians.52 Van Dijk also points out that minorities speaking in the media are seldom left
to speak alone, and that “their accusations of the host society and its elites, when quoted
at all, never go unchallenged.”53 Both these perspectives are evident in the case of the
Norwegian media’s coverage of Mohyeldeen Mohammad. Where Tybring-Gjedde’s opin-
ions are noteworthy due to his position, when presented with a rich offering of ideology
divergent from the acceptable norms—albeit from a completely un-noteworthy source in
the guise of Mohyeldeen Mohammad—the media had a field day.
Bio-politics: Full circle and Then Some
In February 2011, foreman Siv Jensen54 of the Progress Party raised a proposition in
favor of compulsory DNA-sampling and the creation of a DNA-registry for all immigrants
coming to Norway. Furthermore, she argued for an ‘increased effort’ in surveillance of
second generation immigrants, as they purportedly represent nothing but ripe picking
grounds for Islamic terrorists;
All those who are caught committing terrorism, or attempting to commit acts
of terrorism, are essentially people with non-Western backgrounds. These
are people who are recruited among second generation immigrants. . . . they
have grown up in a western society and still managed to be indoctrinated to
hate western values. . . . I do not want to argue that every second generation
immigrant is a potential terrorist; I want to make that clear; that’s not the
case. I point out that this is a situation we need to take seriously, because
this is what is happening.55
51. Dijk, Discourse & Power , 74.
52. Thus confirming the notion of the majority ethnicity as infallible: ‘Even some of you understand
that we are right’.
53. Dijk, Discourse & Power , 75.
54. Though the title clearly denotes the position of a man (at least so, in the Norwegian language, the
Progress Party refused to change the title to ‘party leader’ when a woman took over the job, seeing as
such precautions were seen as ‘politically correct’, hence elitist and unnecessary.
55. Siv Jensen, Dagsrevyen, NRK, February 19, 2011.
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Framing terrorism and war within a terminology of security is hardly surprising: To
the contrary, threats to life and health are obviously already well within a ‘logics of
survival’. It is interesting, however, that Jensen insists that dangers are posited by
Norwegian citizens who are born and raised “in a western society”. Not only is such
a focus heavily relying on the fear of the dormant, invisible ‘sleeper-cell’, as well as on
the ever-recurring syndrome of the static, immutable ‘eternal Jew’: Jensen implies that
second generation immigrants somehow actively manage to get “indoctrinated to hate
western values.” These second-generation citizens, obviously, are essentially not from
other Western countries: they are Muslims and they hate not only our values—they hate
us enough to commit acts of violent terror. And they are in our midst.
The former foreman of the Progress Party, Carl I. Hagen, has become identified as the
primary deliverer in Norway of the international proverb “Not all Muslims are terrorists,
but all terrorists . . . ” Though this line, in all honesty, is quite true when applied to, say,
the predominately Muslim nation of Iraq, it fails miserably in describing the situation
in the Western world. Nevertheless, it is a line that Hagen is encouraged by the media
to repeat as often as possible, unfortunately thereby adding to the ‘truthiness’ of such
affirmations, and, ultimately, constituting such a Norwegian discourse as reality. Most
importantly, in the case of Norway as well as in the rest of Europe during the last decades,
“‘the immigrant other’ [is] increasingly crystallized as ‘the Muslim other’.”56
Securitization is a powerful addition to any citizen’s conceptual toolkit: it enables its
bearer to quickly identify attempts at ‘securitization moves’, and react to them in the
fashion one sees fit. Whereas the study of security in the past has focused primarily on
‘hard’ security threats, cognitive notions of threats to identity and culture is increasingly
viewed through a lens of social or cultural security.
56. Christine M. Jacobsen, “Theory and Politics in Research on Muslim immigrants in Norway,”
Tidsskrift for Islamforskning 2 (2008): 27.
4Norwegianness
Norwegian culture is the sum of what we celebrate on May 17: Common
country, history, traditions, language, holidays, religious background, values,
cultural heritage, laws, currency, etiquette, flag, upbringing, defense, national
anthem, royal house, national team and a thousand other small and big things
that make up a cultural community. That is Norwegian culture for all of you
who feign ignorance. That is Norwegian culture in all its variation—like all
strong, proud cultures have variations. End of discussion.
–Kent Andersen and Christian Tybring-Gjedde, Aftenposten, 2010
Burning Down the House
In 2010, a compound close to the city of Drammen, consisting of three buildings housing
asylum seekers who had had their final appeals for residence in Norway turned down—
burned to the ground after having been set on fire by dismayed ‘un-returnable asylum
seekers’. Armed police arrested over twenty residents, suspected of setting the fire. The
following morning Dagbladet reported that the residents of the compound were “– En-
raged because they did not get halal meat.”57 Later on, Dagbladet followed up with a
‘typical menu’ from the reception center, which consisted of breakfast, hot lunch and
57. Dagbladet.no, “– Forbannet fordi de ikke fikk halalkjøtt,” July 7, 2010.
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supper every day, containing dishes such as fried salmon, fish in curry, grilled chicken and
so on.58
The media coverage of this case illustrates the way in which the media constructs
a seemingly ‘cultural’ conflict, where there is (I submit,) none. Primarily, as it turned
out, very few—if any—residents had ever complained on the lack of halal meat. Many
had, however, complained over the quality—or lack thereof—of the food. In an op-ed
by Kari Helene Partapouli and Rune Berglund Steen from ‘Antirasistisk senter’ (‘Anti-
racist center’), the authors claimed that the living conditions at the reception center were
“indefensible”, and that the center had been “a single long story of personal tragedies,
serious health issues left unattended, isolation, passivity, psychiatric difficulties, hunger
strikes, anxiety, self-harming and even harassment by employees.”59 UDI (Utlendingsdi-
rektoratet; ‘Directorate for Foreigners’), as the responsible state directorate, had been
warned in regards to the conditions several times, lastly only a month before the ‘riots’
broke out. Yet they had disregarded these concerns. In an email to the newspaper, UDI
states that “it is politically determined that this is the offer to individuals who have
received a final rejection of an asylum application, [and] who are obliged to leave Norway
and are staying here illegally.”60 By UDI’s own admission, it is explicitly intended for
these (anti-)reception centers to remain unappealing to immigrants, in the hopes that
immigrants will tire of such an existence, hence willingly return to their country of de-
parture. Furthermore, it is a well established idea in Norwegian asylum discourse that
benevolent treatment of asylum seekers will almost immediately lead to an increase in
asylum immigration.
The phrase ‘un-returnable asylum seeker’—a euphemism for ‘difficult asylum seeker’—
is applied to those who object to leaving Norway voluntarily. The Norwegian government
does not necessarily agree that they are completely unable to return to their country of
origin—for instance, due to legitimate concerns for their own safety—nor does it in any
way imply that they may not be forcibly expelled from Norway by plane and police escort
in the foreseeable future.
The discursive ‘staging’ of this incident by the media shows one more thing; it was
overtly constructed as a clear-cut case of ‘demanding immigrants’ not content with their
treatment—or even—not content with ‘the way we do things here.’ Complaining when
offered three meals a day for free is naturally regarded as ungrateful behavior, and even
more so—and here we arrive at a particularly telling denominator of Norwegianness—
when the lunch offered was hot.
Norwegians—in general—do not eat hot lunches, and it is considered typical to bring
a ‘matpakke’ (bagged lunch) to work or school. As Thomas Hylland Eriksen wrote, now
58. Dagbladet.no, “Her er menyen fra mottaket,” July 7, 2010.
59. Kari Helene Partapouli and Rune Berglund Steen, “Som om ingenting har skjedd,” [As if nothing
has happened], Dagbladet.no, July 13, 2010.
60. Dagbladet.no, “Her er menyen.”
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close to twenty years ago, on the Norwegian totem of identity, the brown cheese;
the brown cheese epitomizes central values in a widespread Norwegian self-
definition: . . . its unspectacular taste signifies frugality and simplicity in style;
its widespread use in the bagged lunches typical of Norwegian society further
expresses a spirit of common sense and a “no-frills” attitude.61
Immigrants are conveyed and subsequently perceived as not only discontent with ‘how we
do it here’; even hot lunches (signifying foreign, continental elitist haut cuisine and urban
lavishness, as opposed to Norwegian, down-to-earth frugality) are not good enough for
them(!). Thus, when the Muslim, halal-demanding Other is unsatisfied by the selection
of culinary possibilities at hand, they promptly resort to violence by rioting and setting
fire to state property. Or so it would seem, if we were to take such articles at face value.
Norwegian Dads vs. Bad Dads
VG, Norway’s largest daily tabloid, has over the course of the last years had a recurring
series of editorials under the title Nye Norge [New Norway]. The series is exclusively con-
cerned with aspects of the contemporary debate on immigration—especially integration—
and the errors of public policy on these matters. In one of these articles, published on
June 5 2010, the newspaper reported on their own survey identifying that young girls
in Oslo were using headscarves during school hours, under the heading “Five-year-olds
wear hijab to school.”62 As a precursory note, it should be pointed out that children
start school in Norway the year they turn six. That is, a certain portion of first-graders
will necessarily remain at the age of five for the duration of the fall semester. The title
suggests that at the time of the printing of the article, there were five-year-olds wearing
hijab at school. The perceptive reader may note that this article was published the fifth
of June, thus eliminating the possibility for this to be true. The title should as such have
been “Five-year-olds wore hijab to school last fall”. However, as one may guess, such a
title would have had less of an immediate impact on the public.63
One father64 voices his opinion on the use of Hijab among children by explicitly stating
61. Thomas Hylland Eriksen, “Being Norwegian in a Shrinking World: Reflections on Norwegian Iden-
tity,” in Continuity and Change: Aspects of Contemporary Norway, ed. Anne Cohen Kiel (Oslo: Scandi-
navian University Press, 1993), 11–37.
62. VG.no, “5-˚aringer bruker hijab p˚a skolen,” June 5, 2010.
63. I am not claiming that attacking headings in Norway’s largest tabloid as sensationalist—and iden-
tifying inconsistencies and sloppy use of present and past tense in the Norwegian language—is a grand
application of Critical Discourse Analysis. One could spend a lifetime undertaking such endeavors with
little or no application of intellectual rigor, method or brainpower. However, this fallacious appliance of
the present tense helps illustrate the rather gymnastic approach to language held by some members of
the press.
64. It should be noted that the guidance regulating the use of quotations in Norwegian media are rather
indulgent. The hyphen (–) before a quote only discerns that the journalist has ‘kept to the meaning
intended’ by the respondent, not necessarily quoted him directly. When quoted directly, the double
inverted commas (“”) are used.
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that he is Norwegian, thus implying such behavior is un-Norwegian:
– As a Norwegian dad, I do not think this is OK. The hijab defines a difference
in treatment between the genders that puts women in an inferior position.
The garment appears to me as encumbering to natural interaction and play
between the children.65
The quotation is probably partly spurious. It is different from a second article published
the same day where he was not quoted as a ‘Norwegian dad’, but simply ‘dad’; the prefix
was likely added—or vice versa, removed—by the journalist.66 However, this carries no
other ramification for the analysis at hand than simply identifying the part ‘Norwegian
dad’ as potentially a creation of the Newspaper itself.
As such, the reader is faced with a particularly interesting notion of nationality,
namely Norwegianness as signified by the adherence to ‘Norwegian fatherhood’, gender
equality and children’s rights. Firstly, the notion of a particular ‘Norwegian blend’ of
fatherhood should be further adressed: Norway is considered to be one of the most gender
equal countries in the world.67 Over the course of the last fifty years, the Norwegian father
has moved away from the former stereotype of ‘the distant father’, no longer necessarily
being the sole breadwinner and increasingly taking paternity leave designated to rearing
children (though women continue to be the primary care-giver in child rearing, as well
as doing the bulk of everyday work within the household).68 Trying to fulfill the role
of the ‘Norwegian good father’ may easily be seen as from Bourdieu’s perspective; not
necessarily only as a classifiable act, but more of an act of classification, or even the actors
self-classification—which in turn can be classified itself. As such, the way the Norwegian
father vocalizes his social identity of a loving parent can be seen as a way to distinguish
himself from those carrying out an inferior form of parenting.69
The modern Norwegian father faces a plethora of identities from which he will have
to define himself. By internalizing positive characteristics and reacting in opposition to
displays of performance of bad fathering, social identity is created. The increasingly
interested, responsible and emotionally committed father is constantly being measured
against the ‘soft’ family values that traditionally have been tightly associated with ma-
ternity. However, his classification of self as a ‘Norwegian father’ carries implicit connota-
tions not only to soft fathering, but also to ‘Norwegian’ fathering, as way of categorizing
65. VG.no, “5-˚aringer bruker hijab.”
66. Cf. VG.no, “5-˚aringer bruker hijab”; con. VG.no, “– Hijab gjør jentene mindreverdige,” June 5,
2010, see also note 64.
67. See e.g. Ricardo Hausmann, Laura D. Tyson, and Saadia Zahidi, The Global Gender Gap Report
2011 (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2011), 8, table 3a.
68. Ann-Zofie Duvander, Trude Lappeg˚ard, and Gunnar Andersson, “Family Policy and Fertility: Fa-
thers’ and Mothers’ Use of Parental Leave and Continued Childbearing in Norway and Sweden,” Journal
of European Social Policy 20 (1 2010): 45 –57.
69. See Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, trans. Richard Nice
(1979; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984), 235, 249, 467, and passim.
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those who do dress their children in hijab. ‘Norwegian’ here becomes a marker of his
group’s ethnicity, implicitly constructing the Other as those who do not subscribe to
‘Norwegianness’. This in turn implies that the Other represents a group who ‘thinks this
is OK’, while those who are ‘Norwegian’ find it unanimously unacceptable, en masse.
Though this is obviously not true, the hijab is designated as inherent to the Other and
completely incompatible with Norwegianness: While ‘Norwegian dads’ want their chil-
dren to be equal regardless of gender and free to play as they please (which is ‘all good’),
other (‘bad’) dads want their children to be unequal and restricted in their play.
Historic Norwegianness?
Whereas a common Norwegian narrative centers around the idea that the roots of Norwe-
gianness, both ethnic and cultural, are predominantly (though not exclusively) historic
(as roots necessarily are) in nature, they have been challenged in novel ways by the
contemporary immigration with subsequent problematizations of citizenship, ethnicity,
national identity and cultural diversity as opposed to the perceived homogeneity of times
gone by.70 The boundaries of the cultural unit are not set in stone: to the contrary,
they are in fact never finished: identities of nation and cultural community are never
quite completed, never fully static. Norwegianness (the ‘cultural stuff’) is, as such, not
necessarily exclusive to ethnic Norwegians. The different markers taken for granted as ex-
pressions of Norwegianness that has come to pass through a common ‘invented tradition’,
which does not necessitate an ethnic vantage point.71
Still today, Norwegian history is a contested one. A common narrative is something
as follows: The Norwegian nation was born by the unification under king Harald H˚arfagre
at Hafrsfjord sometime around 872 AD. The Norwegian Vikings then ruled the North-
Sea basin as raiders, merchants, explorers and settlers. Norway also invented America.
After a short stint under Danish rule (the 400-years’ night) where nothing of interest
happened, Norway won its freedom from Sweden and have defended it heroically ever
since. Needless to say, such narratives—albeit entertaining—have little in common with
the actual occurrences. However, they accentuate certain points of interest when one
is to critically analyze Norwegianness. Though the veracity as such is not in question,
the constructions of Norwegian particularity and exceptionality is the backdrop against
which nationalism and patriotism is drawn.
70. See, e.g. Thomas Hylland Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives, 3rd ed.,
Anthropology, Culture and Society (London: Pluto Press, 2010), 67–69, passim. Liisa Malkki, “National
Geographic: the Rooting of Peoples and the Territorialization of National Identity among Scholars and
Refugees,” Cultural Anthropology 7 (1 1992): 24–44.
71. In fact, I am inclined to submit that Norway with its fin-de-sie`cle national romanticism is indeed a
text-book example of Hobsbawm’s Inventing Tradition’. See Eric Hobsbawm, “Introduction: Inventing
Traditions,” in The Invention of Tradition, ed. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence O. Ranger (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1992), 1–14.
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Naturally, as long as such straight forward imagery of Norwegian history exists, at-
tempts at deconstruction of such founding myths will be undertaken.
When looking at the ”birth” of the Norwegian nation, it is interesting to look into
the lack of propensity for the Viking myth. Though the image of the Norwegian Viking
was extremely popular in the early years of the young Norwegian nation, the interest
and sentiment for identification imploded after the second World War. Hylland Eriksen
notes that, while the Vikings can easily be viewed as the pinnacle of Norwegian identity,
references to the Viking age after the war “. . . became exceedingly problematic in an oth-
erwise Viking-loving country like Norway”72 due to the extensive use of such symbolism
and Viking-derived artwork in the Nazi imagery of the hated Quisling government.
While patriotism and nationalist sentiments are highly visible—in media as well as
everyday life, especially on festive occasions such as Christmas (flags on the tree), birth-
days (flags on the cake) and the National Day (flags everywhere)—it has, however, been
common to regard Norwegian patriotism as an “. . . innocent and charming trait of a small
and equality-oriented country without imperial ambitions.”73
It should be pointed out that the ethnic and cultural disposition of the nation state
has relied on racism as the means towards social cohesion much in the same way as
‘culture’ is used today. Whether the boundaries of Norwegianness are constituted by
perceiving the Other as racially or culturally distinct and un-Norwegian does not really
matter when ‘they’ can be categorized on grounds of their belonging to a particular
group and this un-Norwegianness is ascribed to the group as a whole; every individual
Pakistani, every Arab and every Muslim can be out-defined from Norwegianness. Teun
van Dijk writes in Elite Discourse and Racism that “Negative properties attributed to
the group as a whole are thus applied to its members, who therefore are seen as essentially
alike and interchangeable.”74 Not being Norwegian is sufficiently a ‘negative property’ for
stereotyping as ‘immigrant’ and discriminated against accordingly. It should be lost on
no-one that differences in skin color tend to coincide with the delineations of ‘culture’
commonly described as incompatible to the Norwegian one.
Imagined Sameness
As Marianne Gullestad argues, we can actually identify a particular Norwegian version
of this culturism along old racist boundaries, owing to a history of Nazi occupation and a
72. Thomas Hylland Eriksen, “Traditionalism and Neoliberalism: The Norwegian Folk Dress in the 21st
Century,” in Properties of Culture – Culture as Property: Pathways to Reform in Post-Soviet Siberia,
ed. Erich Kasten (Berlin: Dietrich Reimer Verlag, 2004), 282.
73. Grete Brochmann and Knut Kjeldstadli, A History of Immigration: The Case of Norway 900–2000
(Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2008), 237. It should perhaps be noted that Norway has had, and indeed still
have, explicit ambitions towards a dominant position in the areas around the Arctic oceans (and even
the Antarctic: Norway is the only nation in the world who lay claims to land both in the Arctic and the
Antarctic, a term dubbed “ishavsimperialisme” (“arctic imperialism”, literally “ice ocean imperialism”).
74. Dijk, Discourse & Power , 20.
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strong collective appreciation of egalitarianism: the central value concept of Norwegian-
ness is “[. . . ]likhet [most easily translated as equality ], meaning ‘likeness’, ‘similarity’,
‘identity’ or ‘sameness’.75 As one can already sense in regard to the connotations to
sameness, such equality can become quite stifling of one’s individuality – and exclusive
in regards to ethnicity. Gullestad, nodding to Benedict Anderson, calls this central Nor-
wegian identifier ‘imagined sameness’:
The egalitarian logic can be woven into both egalitarian and hierarchical mod-
els of society. It is not only tied to the term likhet, but also to a whole range
of other expressions such as ‘to fit in together’ (˚a passe sammen) and ‘to
share the same ideas’ (ha sammenfallende synspunkter). Often it implies
that there is a problem when others are perceived to be ‘too different’. Then
the parties often avoid each other. Open conflicts are seen as a threat to
other basic values, such as ‘peace and quiet’. Avoidance can happen prior
to the establishment of imagined sameness, and when it is no longer possible
to maintain. In this way differences are concealed by avoiding those people
who, for one reason or another, are perceived as ‘too different’, and by playing
them down in social interaction with those who are regarded as compatible.
The result is that the dividing-lines between people in terms of social class
have become blurred. At the same time the differences between ‘Norwegians’
and ’immigrants’ have become discursively salient.76
As such, Norwegians may be said to be predisposed xenophobes: the dream of a quiet,
peaceful life among ‘equals’ that takes such prevalence in the national imaginary, is
prone to regard the Other not only as foreign and un-similar, but as a downright threat
to the natural and necessary sameness of ‘our’ community. If Norwegianness is ‘imagined
sameness’, any cultural challenge to the perceived ‘equality’ of ‘us all’ is a direct threat
to Norwegianness itself.
White Norwegianness
In 2006, the weekly Ny Tid contacted the state-funded language council of Norway, ask-
ing if it could be possible to replace the term ‘ethnic Norwegian’, seeing as it excluded
any attempts at ‘becoming Norwegian’ through the adaptation of cultural practices, e.g.
food traditions, customs etc..77 The answer from the language council was negative, ac-
centuating that “. . . a Pakistani that settles in Norway does not become a Norwegian,
whether or not he becomes a Norwegian citizen. He is a Pakistani no matter what.”78
75. Marianne Gullestad, Plausible Prejudice: Everyday Practices and Social Images of Nation, Culture
and Race (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2006), 170.
76. Marianne Gullestad, “Invisible Fences: Egalitarianism, Nationalism and Racism,” Journal of the
Royal Anthropological Institute 8 (1 2002): 47.
77. Ny Tid, “Norsk, norskere, nordmann,” October 27, 2006.
78. NRK.no, “Svar til Ny Tid,” September 11, 2006.
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Similarly, the term ‘immigrant’ is as immutable and perpetual as ‘Norwegian’. As Mar-
ianne Gullestad writes in her collected Plausible Prejudice, “Innvandrer [immigrant] is
today not only a word in the dictionary but also a rhetorically powerful concept. While
its denotation is ‘neutral’, its connotations are negatively charged” and thus constituting
a “hierarchy of dominance.”79
Tonje Vold, writing in Samtiden in the aftermath of the debate on ‘the Norwegian’,
noted that the prevalence of band aids with ‘skin color’, is a rather telling example of the
hegemonic position belonging to the white person;
‘Skin-colored’ is a color in its own, it is pink-yellowish, in posher terms, apri-
cot. Everyone who has put on a ‘skin-colored’ band-aid knows this. Es-
pecially black people. Those who have always been aware that white is
a color, are those who do not share it. Thus, it was obvious for everyone
suddenly excluded from Norwegianness that their common denominator was
non-whiteness . . . The language council did not need the word ‘white’ in its
definition of ‘Norwegian’; all the same that was what it meant.
There is no position more powerful than the one which is ‘only’ human. This
position is a privilege that in contemporary Norway belongs to white Norwe-
gians.80
The Norwegian case is in fact even more specific in its connotations; Norway’s largest
and oldest producer of band-aids is called “Norgesplaster” (Norway’s-band-aid), com-
monly packaged in boxes designed with the Norwegian flag as its most prominent visual
characteristic.
Norwegianness as whiteness is a particularly problematic congruence of identity, due
to its de facto ‘truthiness’—as demonstrated in the outcries of allegations of ‘political
correctness’ in the Norwegian debate on the term ‘who is a Norwegian’—as well as in a
more problematic way: When derived of its connotations to imperialist notions of race
and near history of concentration camps, xenophobia thrives when cultural incommensu-
rability can be argued publicly; it has become possible to be a “respectable racist.”81
79. Marianne Gullestad, “Invisible Fences: Reinventing Sameness and Difference,” in Plausible Prej-
udice: Everyday Practices and Social Images of Nation, Culture and Race (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget,
2006), 174–75.
80. Tonje Vold, “Hvit støy,” [White Noise], Samtiden 1 (2007): 27, my translation.
81. Ibrahim, “The Securitization of Migration,” 167. For a wonderful analysis of an earlier, yet congruent
Norwegian debate, on the term neger [negro], see Marianne Gullestad, “Normalising Racial Boundaries:
The Norwegian Dispute About the Term Neger,” Social Anthropology 13 (1 2005): 27–46. Thomas Hylland
Eriksen’s essay on the use – and censorship – of the term ‘neger’ in Norwegian children’s literature at his
personal website is similarly intriguing, see Thomas Hylland Eriksen, “On Negro Kings and Hottentots,”
Eriksen’s Personal Web Site, 2007, http://folk.uio.no/geirthe/Hottentots.html (accessed July 12,
2011).
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Nationalism, or Inventing Bellybuttons
In order to further illustrate the Norwegian attitude towards immigrants, some short clar-
ifications should be made; ‘Norwegianness’ has its historical roots in the rise of romantic
nationalism in Norway from the latter half of the nineteeth century towards the fin de
sie`cle. Nationalism, according to the well known argument by Ernest Gellner, is a “po-
litical principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent.”82
That is to say, that a group of people of the same kind should hold political sovereignty
over a given geographical territory that coincides with the groups cultural dispersion.
The boundaries of the national—or cultural—-are not set in stone; to the contrary, they
are in fact never finished. Identities of nation and community are never quite completed.
According to Fredrik Barth’s seminal 30-page introduction to his edited anthology Ethnic
Groups and Boundaries, boundaries should not be perceived only as mere delineations
between existing, finished ‘cultures’ and their respective territorial borders.83 In fact, as
Zygmunt Bauman observes, “It is only when the border poles are being dug in and the
guns are aimed at trespassers that the myths of the borders’ antiquity are spun and
the recent cultural/political origins of identity are carefully covered up by the ‘genesis
stories’.”84
In his magnificent essay on Hannah Arendt, Ernst Gellner reminds us not to over-
look the destructiveness of culture when coupled with Nature, that is, Nature legitimized
through science and reason as something a priori true, primordial and unhindered by hu-
man conceptions of morals and norms; such notions were easily coupled with the romantic
focus on rurality and volk -culture, and became an explosive force in nineteenth-century
Europe.85 Gellner wryly goes on to remark in regards to the consequences of this unholy
union, that “Unfortunately, in the nineteenth century, Darwin had also popularized the
fact that Nature had a lot of nasty habits, notably ruthlessness, willingness to elimi-
nate the unfit, and to be very wasteful with life whilst in pursuit of excellence.”86 The
idea of society as not only culturally particular, but also biologically distinct was eas-
ily fused with romanticism into a synthesis where human beings were formed by their
roots, a notion that is both cultural and biological, thus—-here we arrive at the core of
nationalism—leading to the language and euphemisms of nationhood: ‘mother tongue’
and ‘fatherland’.87
82. Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1983), 1.
83. Fredrik Barth, “Introduction,” in Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cul-
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85ff.
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The notion of Norwegianness and the status of Norway as ancient and primordial
is constructed through founding myths, discursive application of language and cultural
practices that aim to reinforce the boundaries against whatever exists outside of the
national community. As such, it has been—and remains—important to weigh in these
practices as tradition, in order to legitimize through history and ‘evolution’ the cultural
uniqueness of Norwegianness. As Eric Hobsbawm points out in his introduction to The
Invention of Tradition, so-called traditions are commonly of a much younger age than
they appear:
‘Invented tradition’ is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed
by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which
seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition, which
automatically implies continuity with the past. In fact, where possible, they
normally attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic past.88
Clashing Garments
In the Norwegian case there is a plethora of such ‘invented traditions’ backing up the
notion of Norwegianness. The bunad may be particularly interesting viewed as invented:
The first ‘big debate’ on the bunad’s relationship with immigrants was over almost a
decade ago: it will suffice to say that it was blatantly xenophobic, arguing back and
forth whether immigrants could even wear a bunad (this, of course, should be seen in
extension of the old Norwegian debate on the localization of different designs—seemingly
a different one for each valley—and whether or not an ethnic Norwegian could ‘choose’
a specific local design or not. Birthplace and kinship was—and is—vocally defended as
the only legitimate rationale for one’s choice, or rather, one’s ‘destiny’). It resurfaced in
a fashion last year, when a young Norwegian named Minna Fahmida Haniffa conducted
the ceremonies at Norway’s Constitution Day at the official gathering in Stavanger, while
wearing a proper, locally rooted bunad—along with the hijab: Pandemonium ensued,
with several hundred comments submitted by readers in the immediate aftermath (in a
regional paper), angry letters by readers, and politicians arguing back and forth in the
weeks that came.89
As an illustrative note to show just how unsettling this behavior was, The state
broadcaster NRK ran an article a month before the incident in Stavanger, claiming that
the national advisory board on bunads had recommended that embroidered hijabs should
be incorporated as a voluntary accessory to the bunad on festive occasions, to ‘ease
integration’ into Norwegian society: The article was published April 1, as a joke. To the
NRK, it apparently seemed wholly unlikely—and proper good fun—that anyone would
88. Hobsbawm, “Introduction: Inventing Traditions,” 1.
89. Aftenbladet.no, “– Hijab og bunad passer godt sammen,” May 17, 2009.
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even consider such an obvious abomination to be true.90
Parallel to what Hugh Trevor-Roper showed in his study of the kilt and Scottish
‘national culture’,91 the bunad has a similarly convoluted history of forced traditional-
ism. Whereas folk costumes were indeed present in certain parts of Norway before the
rise of nationalism, the recent omnipresence of such garments, their regionally codified
design, and their disconnection from traditional rural life are of recent date. In reality,
the bunad itself is but a construction to begin with: it was invented at the height of
Norwegian romantic nationalism, adding to the arsenal of arguments propounding the
primordial exclusiveness of Norwegianness. Hylland Eriksen notes that, though the pri-
mary proponents of nationalism were the urban elite—effectively backed up by the petty
bourgeois—the “bunad confirms Norwegian identity as an essentially rural one, where
personal integrity is connected to roots and regional origins.”92
Anti-Urban, Anti-Elite, Anti-Danish Norwegianness
Taking as a vantage point Hobsbawm’s notion that nations seek to establish continu-
ity with a desired (or for the job at hand, suitable) past, it is clear that the focus on
Norwegianness as rurality coupled with the proud culture of the historical figure og the
Norwegian ‘free farmer’—a construct is born with potential to be effective in countering
the elites, who by all standards tend to be predominantly urban. Seeing as, in the Norwe-
gian case, the ‘urban elites’ one wanted to get rid of when birthing a new nation were the
Danish civil servants operating from what is now Oslo, the Norwegian elites themselves
(who were more than ready to fill the shoes of the Danes) fully supported such a cultural
return to Norway’s rural roots.
Richard Sennett calls the feeling of disdain for the elites ressentiment : In his Fall of
Public Man, he argues that—though such an anti-urban ressentiment was helpful during
the birth of the nation—the ‘new elite’ (those who necessarily rise to power and wealth
as a consequence of their wielding of rural anti-elitist discourse) at some point will have
problems with distinguishing themselves from the elite they once so valiantly rose up
against.93 However, Sennett suggests, this can be avoided by keeping a charismatic anti-
elitist moral point of view, while effectively deflecting attention away from one’s actual
doings in office:
The successful practitioner of this status anger must in fact continually turn
people’s attention away from his political actions and position and instead
90. NRK.no, “Satser p˚a bunad og hijab,” April 1, 2009.
91. Hugh Trevor-Roper, “The Invention of Tradition: The Highland Tradition of Scotland,” in The
Invention of Tradition, ed. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence O. Ranger (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1992), 15–42.
92. Eriksen, “Traditionalism and Neoliberalism,” 276.
93. Sennett, The Fall of Public Man, 277–82.
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absorb them in his moral intentions. The existing order will continue then to
sleep peacefully because his apparent anger at the Establishment is perceived
wholly in terms of his impulses and motive, rather than what he does with
his power.94
In contemporary Norway, this is easy to identify—especially so in the discourse of the
right-wing populist Progress Party: Skilled at talking against the ‘political elites’, the
‘cultural elites’, and immigrants alike, thus calling themselves ‘the party for most peo-
ple’. Though ‘most people’ (in ‘most cases’) vote for other parties, right wing parties
preying upon nationalist discourse, xenophobia and populist sentiments of ‘national cul-
ture’ have emerged across the European continent in recent times, and done so with a
considerable degree of success. Though ressentiment of the elites is not entirely sufficient
in explaining this return to the ideas of nationalism—thought by many within academia
to be a thing of the past—it stands as a telling example of the power of binary oppo-
sitions on nation and power in European political life: rural ‘commoners’ against urban
elites, rootedness against intellectual cosmopolitanism, national cultural identity against
multicultural chaos.
As illustrated by the reactions towards the combination of the bunad and the hijab,
the inclination towards moderating displays of ethnicity, religiosity or general group-
adherence in the public sphere may very well be a badly concealed expression of Norwe-
gianness itself. The characteristic of zealous boundary-drawing between these spheres has
been ascribed to the ‘national culture’ of Norway and Norwegians by domestic anthropol-
ogists for quite some time. This boundary, as emphasized by Bhikhu Parekh, has a long
history where the public realm is perceived as one of unity and universalism, represented
by the state, which “has no moral status, and its sole raison d’eˆtre is to uphold and nur-
ture its constituent cultural communities”, whereas all that ‘deeply matters’ to people;
customs, values, and other facilities of identity, is purely derived from culture, belonging
to the privatized sphere of the home.95 This division is contested when proponents of
multiculturalist policies argue the recognition of culture as ‘universally particular’, that
is, as that which constitutes our identity by way of group adherence, be it minority or
majority.96
Dressing for the Age of Clashes
As noted by Marianne Gullestad, the possibilities of choosing or constructing one’s iden-
tity freely from religious pressure, is only valid within the given frameworks of the national
94. Sennett, The Fall of Public Man, 279.
95. Bhikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory, 2nd ed. (Bas-
ingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 200.
96. See in particular Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, ed. Amy
Gutmann (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).
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norms of limited spheres. The hijab is viewed as malignant due to it being firstly, involun-
tary, sexist and foreign—and secondly, a threat to boundaries between the secular public
sphere and the privatized, family-centric religious life, on which the Norwegian national
order of things rest upon.97 Norwegians are prone to find this display of religious identity
uncanny, that is in the Freudian capacity as something that ‘mirrors’ our own behavior
or form of life, yet in a different and undefinable way—a way that renders the Other
uncomfortably close yet culturally incommensurable.98 Within this setting of obfuscated
liminality of identity, Norwegianness constitutes the “undefined normative center” of the
debate on immigration and integration (understood as lock and stock assimilation on the
immigrants’ behalf), unfortunately often foregoing any possibility of further refining or
conceptualizing what ‘Norwegianness’ is really all about.99
97. Marianne Gullestad, Det norske sett med nye øyne, [The Norwegian(ness) seen with new eyes] (Oslo:
Universitetsforlaget, 2002), 35.
98. See Sigmund Freud, “The ‘Uncanny,’” in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological
Works of Sigmund Freud. Trans. James Strachey, vol. XVII: (1917–1919) An Infantile Neurosis and
Other Works (1919; London: Hogarth, 1955), 217–256.
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5Enlightenment
There is strong shadow where there is much light.
–Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Go¨tz von Berlichingen
The contemporary European debate on immigration should be addressed as what it
has become; an overarching container for many different debates that are deceptively
incorporated into a discourse of a foreign and purportedly threatening ‘Islamic culture’,
which in turn is increasingly securitized as a threat both to our safety, and also to our own
‘culture’. It seems that there is no longer a debate on immigration and integration in the
European media; it has been incorporated into—and partly replaced by—a discourse on
Islam, terrorism, forced marriages, ‘honor killings’, hijab, genital mutilation and sharia.
Conversely, ‘European culture’ is constructed as an Enlightenment Leitkultur into which
Muslim immigrants —if they (unfortunately, from a European point of view) manage
to get here—should immediately assimilate, abandoning wholesale their own backwards
culture as irreconcilable with Enlightenment values and ‘become European’, though, as
Liz Fekete writes in the aptly titled A Suitable Enemy, “. . . it is tacitly assumed that this
is something they can never really achieve.”100
100. Liz Fekete, A Suitable Enemy: Racism, Migration and Islamophobia in Europe (London: Pluto
Press, 2009), 87.
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What is Enlightenment?
In 1784 Immanuel Kant had a short opinion piece responding to the question “What
is Enlightenment?” published in the Berlinische Monatschrift. “Enlightenment”, he
answers, “is man’s emergence from his self-imposed immaturity”, where “immaturity is
the inability to use one’s understanding without guidance from another.”101
From the dawn of historical enlightenment, Kant’s gesture is one drawimg Enlight-
enment philosophy out of the study chambers of the celebrated ‘men of letters’ and
activating their philosophy in political terms as a pedagogic program. Many years later
Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, having managed to flee Nazi-Germany, addresses
Kant’s conceptualization on the background of what they see as the bastard child of
the age of Enlightenment: The failure to develop a system of criticism internal to the
subjective reason implicit in Kant’s dictum ‘Sapere Aude’:
What appears to be the triumph of subjective rationality, the subjection of all
reality to logical formalism, is paid for by the obedient subjection of reason to
what is directly given. What is abandoned is the whole claim and approach
of knowledge: to comprehend the given as such; not merely to determine the
abstract spatio-temporal relations of the facts which allow them just to be
grasped, but on the contrary to conceive them as the superficies, as mediated
conceptual moments which come to fulfillment only in the development of
their social, historical, and human significance.102
The Enlightenment, while aiming to free science and knowledge from the hands of mis-
conceived authorities readied the ground—in the eyes of Adorno and Horkheimer—both
for the rise of authoritarian and fascist dictatorships, and for the misuse of it’s neutral
bureaucracy and industry in exterminating a people. Adorno and Horkheimer argue that
“the self-oblivious instrumentalization of science” has made science a tool of capitalism
and industry instead of becoming the instrument of human emancipation it was supposed
to: “[T]he Enlightenment has always aimed at liberating men from fear and establishing
their sovereignty. Yet the fully enlightened earth radiates disaster triumphant.”103
The criticism by Adorno and Horkheimer of the subjection of instrumental reason
has become a formational feature of the scholarly advancement of relativism, of the
idea that the internal claim to truth posited by the philosophical advancement of En-
lightenment philosophy must be countered by a criticism of the dogmatic—and therefore
problematic—beliefs this system still relies upon. As Habermas points out in commenting
on the mode of thinking developed by Adorno and Horkheimer:
101. Immanuel Kant, “An Answer to the Question: ’What is Enlightenment?’” In Kant: Political Writ-
ings, 2nd ed., ed. Hans Siegbert Reiss, trans. Barry H. Nisbet (1784; Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1991), 54.
102. Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming (1944;
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With their concept of “instrumental reason” Horkheimer and Adorno want to
add up the cost incurred in the usurpation of reason’s place by a calculating
intellect. This concept is simultaneously supposed to recall that when pur-
posive rationality, overblown into a totality, abolishes the distinction between
what claims validity and what is useful for self-preservation, and so tears down
the barrier between validity and power, it cancels out those basic conceptual
differentiations to which the modern understanding of the world believed it
owed the definitive overcoming of myth. . . . this description is paradoxical,
because in the moment of description it still has to make use of the critique
that has been declared dead. It denounces the Enlightenment’s becoming
totalitarian with its own tools.104
In other words, where Adorno and Horkheimer attempts to overcome the lack of critical
power in the intellectual inheritance of the Bourgeois revolutions of the eighteenth century,
a lack that had—for them—manifested itself in the rise to power of European fascism,
Habermas points out that their own project amounts to a self-devouring gesture in the
sense that it is not able to move beyond the intellectual inheritance it attempts to distance
itself from.
In the preface to A Revolution of the Mind, Jonathan Israel identifies the political
achievements of historical Enlightenment and sees them under attack by the conceptual
critique coming out of the position inhabited by the argument of Adorno and Horkheimer.
Defining “Radical Enlightenment” as a
set of basic principles that can be summed up concisely as: democracy; racial
and sexual equality; individual liberty of lifestyle; full freedom of thought, ex-
pression, and the press; eradication of religious authority from the legislative
process and education; and full separation of church and state. . . . Its univer-
salism lies in its claim that all men have the same right to pursue happiness in
their own way, and think and say whatever they see fit, and no one, including
those who convince others they are divinely chosen to be their masters, rulers,
or spiritual guides, is justified in denying or hindering others in the enjoyment
of rights that pertain to all men and women equally.105
As such, Israel re-radicalizes the Enlightenment that Adorno and Horkheimer has dis-
missed in developing a mode of analysis that aims to explain how otherization is a phe-
nomenon contingent with the tradition of Enlightenment itself. The implicit argument
being that Enlightenment is better represented through an appropriation of its still valid
critical potential, rather than through the skepticist containment performed by Adorno
and Horkheimer. This argument is unfortunately double edged and manifests itself as
quite a dilemma: On the one hand, the Western world should as such argue for the uni-
versality of the Enlightenment principles, extending them to anyone who would care to
104. Habermas, “The Entwinement of Myth and Enlightenment,” 119.
105. Jonathan I. Israel, A Revolution of the Mind: Radical Enlightenment and the Intellectual Origins
of Modern Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), vii–viii.
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take part in the freedom it promises. On the other hand, such an extension could be seen
as pulpiteering the superiority of Western thought and values—effectively legitimizing
the multicultural criticism of globalization-as-westernization—arguing that “to attribute
universal validity and superiority over other cultural traditions to core values forged in
the Western Enlightenment smacks, whatever its pretensions to rational cogency, of Eu-
rocentrism, elitism, and lack of basic respect for the ‘other’.”106
Culture Clashes
In his 1993 article “The Clash of Civilizations?”, Samuel Huntington famously hypoth-
esized that in the post Cold War era “the fundamental source of conflict . . . will not be
primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and
the dominating source of conflict will be cultural.”107 Huntington further embellishes his
notion of culture in his subsequent book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of
the World Order, arguing that humanity has been thrown into an ‘identity crisis’, and
claiming that
while a country could avoid Cold War alignment, it cannot lack an identity.
The question, ‘Which side are you on?’ has been replaced by the much more
fundamental one, ‘Who are you?’ Every state has to have an answer. That
answer, its cultural identity, defines the state’s place in world politics, its
friends, and its enemies.108
Huntingtons thesis became a seminal idea of American Neo-Conservatism, arguing that
after an era of ideological alignment comes the time of the civilization—of culture as the
core of psychological identification: “In coping with identity crisis, what counts for people
are blood and belief, faith and family. People rally to those with similar ancestry, reli-
gion, language, values, and institutions and distance themselves from those with different
ones.”109
Huntington’s assumptions of culture as a necessary precondition of politics and power
demands the primacy of psychological and cultural explanans. Replacing a critical ma-
terial analysis and heed of political agency with a cultural causality has left the ground
ripe for further application of Huntington’s principles by a range of different actors—none
more aggressive than American Neo-conservative television pundits—effectively propagat-
ing the framing of contemporary conflicts in cultural, religious or ethnic terms, when they
106. Israel, A Revolution of the Mind , xiv.
107. Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72 (3 1993): 22; emphasis
mine.
108. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York:
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are in fact political. This is not to say that the cultural framing is unimportant: Dis-
carding the notion that political conflicts are cultural does not leave out the actors’ own
interpretations and shared narratives as non-consequential—in fact, such perspectives
may help us examine why politics take the form that they do, contextualize them and
tell us why particular expressions of politics happen at a given time and at a particular
place.110
Enlightened We Stand
The emergence of the Enlightenment as a contemporary focus of cultural self-identification
is closely related to the problem of stadial history as criticized by Daniel Carey and Sven
Trakulhun: “An imposed narrative of historical progression authorized the destruction
of primitive cultures in favour of assimilation to a European standard of civility.”111
While the opposite position on historiography—a complete regression of cultural
relativism—is commonly ascribed to any focus of plural conceptions of cultures,112 a more
anthropologically sensitive critique of Herderian historiography may lead us to a clearer
apprehension of the Enlightenment as applied in the contemporary setting: “World his-
tory” is consistently portrayed as a step-by-step progression in which the Enlightened
West is the civilizational watermark, not problematizing its own role in the epistemo-
logical dominance and downright economic suppression of others for centuries, and it is
thus a necessary precondition for discussing postcolonial history to address the legacy of
injustice that plagues the former colonies and their inhabitants conceptions of the West
and of themselves.113
Building on this positive identification of Enlightenment as ‘ours’ both historically and
geographically, it becomes necessary to (out-)define ‘the other’, namely the immigrant.
If it had not been for the post World War immigration, the other would likely have
remained the orientalized inhabitants of a country far way, not so much threatening our
existence as constituting a colorful backdrop of the unique position of the West. With the
increased contact ‘back home’, the immigrant other has become what Mary Douglas calls
“matter out of place”, effectively contravening a set of formerly established relations.114
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Consumer-Purity
One particular aspect of postmodern, “Western” purity is the consumerist citizen, rejoic-
ing in what Zygmunt Bauman describes as a “never ending chase after even more intense
sensations and even more exhilarating experience”.115
In the ‘good old days’, before immigration was properly problematized in the Norwe-
gian population’s conceptual toolbox, Norwegian annoyance of others not partaking in
either ‘our economy’ (cheating our GNP) or our way of life when taking advantage of our
hospitality was directed at German tourists. Arriving every spring, as noted in an op-
ed in Aftenposten a few years back, “German RV-tourists, complaining over Norwegian
price levels—but well equipped with freezers and german canned beer—empty Norwegian
fjords for fish, even throwing their lines into the enclosures of fish farms in order to bring
fat, free salmon home.”116
Immigrants and refugees are not only a clear economical underclass—they are blamed
for their very poorness. The way in which ethnic Norwegians view refugees’ second
hand baby strollers and less than fashionable winter clothing is a travesty: systemic
discrimination in the job market withstanding, immigrants should, for lack of talking or
looking like ‘us’, at least live like ‘us’, i.e. consume like us. Spending is living, more than
any other marker or Western civilization.
Enlightenment as Neoliberalism
From the very cradle of Enlightenment thought, the idea of liberal economic policies has
been at its heart.Especially so in its focus on capitals necessary transgression of the bor-
ders of nation states; words of warning were written by Adam Smith in his concluding
remarks on The Wealth of Nations, that the merchant “is in great measure indifferent
[. . . ] from what place he carries out his trade; and a very trifling disgust will make him
remove his capital, and, together with it, all the industry which it supports, from one
country to another.”117 Economic freedom as potentially harmful for what Lisa Malkki
calls “the national order of things”,118 was but a forerunner of the vast literature on the
contemporary malignant implications of neoliberal globalization.119 However, whereas
economic freedom as a virtue of modernity is argued openly in many fora, and has been
so successfully for many decades, the neoliberal argumentation for a laissez-faire pol-
icy is increasingly expressed within the framework of Enlightenment discourse as but a
115. Bauman, Postmodernity and Its Discontents, 14.
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contingency of freedom. As David Harvey conveys in the title of the first chapter of A
brief history of Neoliberalism, “Freedom’s just another word. . . ”: the principles of equal
access to freedom summed up by Jonathan Israel, had in the discourse of the Bush-
administration become only a catch-word, easily emptied of all meaning save the one
given by those who wield it by force.
Needless to say, victims of recent wars waged by the West, have been left wondering
if the graces of Enlightenment and freedom was worth the cost. Clearly, when reading
Hirsi Ali, Huntington or just turning on the television set, there seems to be a need to
reinvest effort in the notion that the current state of any so-called civilizational or cultural
divide, either between nations or within nations, or as a consequence of migrations, has
been formed against the background of economic globalization. As Gayatri Spivak notes:
“globality is invoked in the interest of the financialization of the globe, or globalization.
To think globality is to think the politics of thinking globality.”120 To think in global terms
without thinking about the financial structures against which the concepts participating
in this thinking have been formed, comprises a failure to appreciate the interests behind
their formation.
Norwegian Enlightenment?
In Western nations, the Enlightenment values are also commonly presented as national
values. Whereas the images of one’s own nation’s exceptionality is quite common among
most of the nations in the world, Norwegians have added an extra twist: As the NUPI
report Norske selvbilder og norsk utenrikspolitikk [Norwegian images of self and Norwegian
foreign policy] claims,
Norway, as quite a number of other countries, have kept themselves with an
image of self as a nation that is unique and of high moral standards. However,
Norway is one of relatively few countries that have included into this image
of self a responsibility to altruistically spread the good word.121
This national hubris of “samaritanism” is quite poignantly represented by the long his-
tory of Norwegian Lutheran missionaries practicing in the developing world. Further-
more, the stories and images brought home by missionaries from Africa, Central Asia
and parts of Latin America have helped reinforce the notion of a binary world view in
which not only the rich help the poor, nor the morally upright help the crooked heathens,
120. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing
Present (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 364.
121. Halvard Leira, ed., Norske selvbilder og norsk utenrikspolitikk, [Norwegian images of self and Nor-
wegian foreign policy], in collab. with Axel Borchgrevink et al., NUPI-report, Norwegian Institute of
International Affairs, 2007, 10b, my translation. Please note the slightly more overt connotations of the
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but also in more basic terms; light conquers darkness, delineating us from them in bi-
nary oppositions, while implicitly exempting those nations and immigrants the ‘big we’
have nothing against: those who share our Enlightenment values. The fact that these
immigrants—from the EU, United States, Canada and Australia—also share our skin
color is acknowledged as nothing but a coincidence. This easily identifiable opposition of
religious symbolism matched the hues of skin to such a degree that it has remained in
the minds of Norwegians up until our own days.122
The idea of Norwegian adherence to all things good was eloquently put by former
prime minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, by stating that “it is typically Norwegian to
be good” (det er typisk norsk a˚ være god). This sentiment —most likely shared by
the majority of her constituents at the time as well as now—is a fitting image of what
Norwegianness is all about: Being better and kinder than anyone else anywhere. Whereas
the duality of good (both as ‘capable’ and ‘kind’) is perhaps even more explicit in an
English translation, such a dualism is not lost on Norwegians themselves. Øyvind Østerud
writes in his essay on Norway’s ambitions of being a humanitarian power, that Norwegian
foreign policy is heavily influenced by a ‘policy of engagement’ (engasjementspolitikk): it
enables a small country such as Norway to stock up on political capital through goodwill
among the larger international powers, as well as creating a non-controversial point of
unity within the politics of the interior.123 While the words of former prime minister
Brundtland have been recycled to the degree where it has lost all original context and
meaning, the idea of Norway’s position in the international society of nations is heavily
influenced by the Norwegian particularity of benevolence. Bringing peace and prosperity
to the world seems to be Norway’s main raison d’etre, while at the same time constituting
powerful modes of identity creation.
The roots of the contemporary use of “Enlightenment values” are predominantly
(though not exclusively) derived from a historic period of which the principles it prop-
agated has now been decisively removed from. In this ‘un-grounding’ of the concept,
the principles of freedom, equality have become to be reserved for the privileged West,
whereas a binary has been constructed between the Enlightened, Western values and the
values of the Other, that is, Islam. This bipolarity has been both solidified and challenged
in novel ways by the contemporary immigration to Europe with subsequent problemati-
zations of citizenship, ethnicity, national identity and cultural diversity as opposed to the
perceived cultural homogeneity of times gone by. Without going into a long discussion of
conceptualizations of racism and racist practices, it should be pointed out that the ethnic
122. For a spirited defense of missionaries’ portrayed images of their sheep (unfortunately bordering
on apologetism), see Karina Hestad Skeie, “Beyond Black and White: Reinterpreting “the Norwegian
Missionary Image of the Malagasy”,” in Encounter Images in the Meetings Between Africa and Europe,
ed. Mai Palmberg (Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 2001), 162–182.
123. Øyvind Østerud, “Lite land som humanitær stormakt?” [Small Country as Humanitarian Great
Power?] Nytt Norsk Tidskrift 23 (4 2006): 304.
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and cultural disposition of the nation state has relied on racism as the means towards
social cohesion much in the same way as ‘culture’ is used today. Whether the cultural
boundaries of Europe are constituted by perceiving the Other as racially or culturally
distinct and un-European or un-Norwegian does not really matter when ‘they’ can be cat-
egorized on grounds of their belonging to a particular group and this un-Norwegianness
is ascribed to the group as a whole; every individual Pakistani, every Arab and every
Muslim can be out-defined from Norwegianness or Europeanness. Teun van Dijk writes
in Elite Discourse and Racism that “[n]egative properties attributed to the group as a
whole are thus applied to its members, who therefore are seen as essentially alike and
interchangeable.”124 Unfortunately, it seems not being European is sufficient a ‘negative
property’ for stereotyping as ‘immigrant’ and discriminated against accordingly.
Ian Buruma proproses that in fact, the contemporary call for Enlightenment values
is in part a ‘revolt against a revolt’/ – the conservative reaction to a perceived failure of
tolerance and multiculturalism:
They believe, like some former leftists, that multiculturalism was a mistake;
our fundamental values must be reclaimed. Because secularism has gone
too far to bring back the authority of the churches, conservatives and neo-
conservatives have latched onto the Enlightenment as a badge of national or
cultural identity. The Enlightenment, in other words, has become the name
for a new conservative order, and its enemies are the aliens, whose values we
can’t share.125
One of the most vocal subscribers—at least from media’s point of view—to Hunting-
ton’s view on clashing cultures is Ayaan Hirsi Ali. In the recently published accounts of
her travels ‘through the clash of civilizations’. Hirsi Ali, herself of Muslim background,
sums up her position in a way that is both telling and unsettling:
A culture that celebrates femininity and considers women to be the masters
of their own lives is better than a culture that mutilates girls’ genitals and
confines them behind walls and veils or flogs or stones them for falling in
love. A culture that protects women’s rights by law is better than a culture
in which a man can lawfully have four wives at once and women are denied
alimony and half their inheritance. A culture that appoints women to its
supreme court is better than a culture that declares that the testimony of a
woman is worth half that of a man. It is part of Muslim culture to oppress
women and part of all tribal cultures to institutionalize patronage, nepotism,
and corruption. The culture of the Western Enlightenment is better.126
124. Dijk, Elite Discourse and Racism, 20.
125. Ian Buruma, Murder in Amsterdam: The Death of Theo Van Gogh and the Limits of Tolerance
(New York: Penguin Press, 2006), 34.
126. Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Nomad: From Islam to America: A Personal Journey Through the Clash of Civi-
lizations (New York: Free Press, 2010), 212–213.
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Clearly, Hirsi Ali purports that it is culture that celebrates or mutilates, culture that
legislates or oppresses. She insists that ‘culture’ not only expresses the founding truths
about society, she has made it into an actor. Furthermore, borrowing the notion of a
‘clash’ from Huntington, Hirsi Ali seems to assume that the lack of things such as genital
mutilation, veils, stoning, as well as the apparent nonexistence of institutionalized cor-
ruption makes ‘the culture of Western Enlightenment’ comparatively better than Muslim
and tribal cultures. The idea she must be seen as propagating here is that as long as
a political body is a cultural body, the political gains that have been made within that
specific body cannot have been achieved through political struggle, but must rather have
been brought about through the cultural-psychological mindset of the society at large.
Worse still, rather than creating a climate in which political reforms can be sought, such
a narrative stands in danger of turning the achievements of political reform that have
been achieved in the Western, Enlightened world into Fukuyama’s ‘End of history’ rather
than a ground for further development.
The point of this excercise of tentative reconfiguration of the ‘Enlightenment princi-
ples’ as portrayed in the discourse of ‘Western culture’ is this: the adherence to cultural-
psychological modes of causality as originally expressed in Huntington’s clashing civiliza-
tions is fundamentally flawed: it necessarily de-emphasizes political agency and economic
inequality as explanatory models. Furthermore, it furthers a world view in which the West
is seen as the pinnacle of history—as an inherently unobtainable goal for all others—
effectively cementing enormous economic and material inequalities and legitimizing them
within a cultural framework.
6Inevitable Conclusions
Good creatures, do you love your lives
And have you ears for sense?
Here is a knife like other knives,
That cost me eighteen pence.
I need but stick it in my heart
And down will come the sky,
And earth’s foundations will depart
And all you folk will die.
–A.E. Housman
Hanna Arendt once said that under conditions of tyranny it is far easier to act than to
think. Thinking people are hard pressed to consider Norwegian society a tyranny, yet
Anders Behring Breivik acted out of a conviction that his worldview was denied the public
recognition it deserved, and sought to rectify the situation through what he considered a
public relations stunt.127 Witnessing Rudolf Eichmann’s trial in Jerusalem, Arendt was
struck by a manifest shallowness in the doer that made it impossible to trace
the incontestable evil of his deeds to any deeper level of roots or motives.
The deeds were monstrous, but the doer—at least the very effective one now
127. All speculations concerning Behring Breivik’s motivations and opinions in the subsequent sections
are drawn from his ‘manifesto’, see Anders Behring Breivik [Andrew Berwick, pseud.], “2083: A European
Declaration of Independence” (London, 2011), original link is no longer available; see the bibliography
for more information (accessed July 23, 2011).
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on trial—was quite ordinary, commonplace, and neither demonic nor mon-
strous.128
This banality of evil becomes—in more ways than it’s most tabloid sense—quite evi-
dent in the persona of Anders Behring Breivik. The attack necessitated banalification.
Clearly, a failed business entrepreneur in his thirties living with his mother, playing online
computer games around the clock, made characterizations of banality an easy exercise.
Furthermore, his apparent troubles with women, his family background, his deteriorating
friendship—in addition to speculations about his sexual preferences—all gave the Nor-
wegian and international media different angles to attack the perpetrator as a loser, a
pathetic geek, a deviant.
Nevertheless, though his life until recently had amounted to little, Breivik had a
magnanimous dream: He saw himself as the heroic knight (literally) that would save
Europe, Norway, Christianity and the Enlightenment from the Muslim threat. The need
to ridicule the perpetrator, though understandable, should thus be set aside for the time
being: Breivik, though incontestably shallow, turned out to be exactly what Eichmann
was not: A demonic and monstrous mass-murderer capable of executing children, point
blank while laughing. His actions were unthinkable, or at least so to the vast majority
of Norwegians that were faced with the horrific realization that it was one of ‘us’, in
our midst, that had committed these atrocities: A white, upper middle class, ‘culturally
christian’ boy from the west side of Oslo.
What happened? What malicious world view could support such horrible actions?
Or was there, hope against hope, no reason at all?
Nothing is Rotten in the Kingdom of Norway
Terrorists brewed at home are madmen. Whereas Islamic terrorism is religiously justi-
fied, or explained within ‘Arab’ cultural-psychologial terms, terrorists of ‘our own’ are
considered criminally insane, thus excempt not only from punitive action, but also as
fundamentally removed from the society they adhere to. Certainly, Breivik has to be
insane? Arguments towards Breivik representing the relative novelty ‘Christian extrem-
ist/terrorist’ were dismissed quickly and, probably, correctly. How could any Norwegian
in their right mind commit such atrocities? All too easily these question are answered
by new ones: Were the terrorists flying the planes into twin towers of the World Trade
Center crazy too? Was Adolf Hitler insane? Was Rudolf Eichman? Is fascism simply a
medical aﬄiction (and if so, what are its epidemiologic capabilities? How does it spread)?
In the days that followed the publication of a forensic psychiatrist’s reports, assess-
ing the psyche of Breivik—and deeming him unaccountable for his actions, as he was
128. Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: Viking
Press, 1965), 4.
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diagnosed a paranoid schizophreniac—Norwegian newspapers were ripe with paranoid
schizophreniacs desperately trying to distance and distinguish themselves from the mass-
murderer, much like the desperate attempts made by different actors on the far right field
of Norwegian politics’ spectrum after it became clear that the perpetrator was a former
member of the Progress Party.
Eerily, the distinction between ‘us and them’—when faced with a new threat from
within the ranks of ‘our own’—has been reframed and is establishing itself as us and him.
Breivik needs be removed from the community at large, not merely physically for the sake
of safety, but also mentally for the collective’s peace of mind. A sane product of society
commiting mass murder, would not reflect well on the society that raised him. Distance
must be established, and matters out of place need to be identified as excactly that; out
of place, as foreign to ‘our ways’. Seemingly, mass-murderer is as un-Norwegian as one
can get.
For the Progress Party, designating Anders Behring Breivik as the constitutive outside
of Norwegianness—and the inside as including the Progress party—quickly became a key
mission. The proximity of ideology between their own political program and the policies
proponed in Breiviks manifesto—not to mention his former party membership—rendered
the Progress party uncomfortable—as rightly it should. In fact, it became quite clear
that the entire right wing of Norwegian politics was vesting an interest in Breivik being
considered a madman.
Cathrine Holst, the editor of Nytt norsk tidsskrift [New Norwegian journal] commented
in the introduction to the first issue after the attacks; if one belongs to the political and
ideological left, having argued against a public debate of racism and Islamophobia, the
July 22. attacks were obviously the logical conclusion of this development: If, on the other
hand, one belongs in the camp which, prior to the attacks have been criticizing Islam
and Islamism, Anders Behring Breivik’s racism and conservative ideology fall a good way
further to the back among the selection of plausible rationales for his actions.129
Less than a year before the July 22. attacks, the aforementioned Progress Party MP
Christian Tybring-Gjedde —together with party colleague Kent Andersen—wrote an op-
ed in Aftenposten, fervently attacking the Labor Party’s “multicultural experiment”,
asking what the “goal of stabbing our own culture in the back” was. What is wrong with
Norwegian culture? “Why was it not good enough for the Labor Party?”, the authors
asked (suddenly using the past tense, implying that the Norwegian culture was already
a thing of the past):
We know we will never get a meaningful answer. Norwegian culture will
become ever more marginalized, and remade into symbols of an intolerant
and excluding past.
129. Cathrine Holst, “Etter terroren,” [After the terror], Nytt Norsk Tidskrift 28 (4 2011): 332–333.
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But, will we help the Labor Party in exchanging Norwegian culture with
“multiculture”? Never! Will we contribute to the culture-treachery? Not
if anyone put up the poster “He will be shot, who . . . ”! Will we ever feel
“multicultural”? Not in a million years!
For we do not believe in multiculture. We believe it is a dream from Dis-
neyland. Systematized rootlessness. Idiocy in the long run, and we believe it
may come to tear our country to shreds.130
The idea that Norwegian culture is under threat by an unwanted dilution or subversion
of its culture by immigrants, carrying with them customs, values and religious practices
not commensurable with national values, is not particular to Anders Behring Breivik,
nor to Norway: the same jargon and discourse of ‘us’ and ‘them’ is found throughout
Europe, fueled and sustained by the rise of right-wing populists in countries such as
France, Britain, Sweden and Denmark; further fueled by catastrophic unemployment,
outright fascist and national-socialist groups are stirring too, especially in Southern and
Eastern Europe.
There should be a growing unease when confronted with political and media discourse
on European or Norwegian “values”: the incessant political capitalization of fear, either
on behalf of ‘our own’ culture’s perpetuation or ‘their’ culture’s threatening backwardness
and the regress of those principles of the Enlightenment I submit to be of the utmost
importance—e.g. equal opportunity to freedom—has had detrimental effects not only
to the lives of immigrants, but—I claim—also to the ethical and normative inheritance
that Europeans themselves once subscribed to. The polarization between the Western
Enlightenment and the Other-as-Islam that accelerated enormously in the wake of the
9/11 attacks, left the ground ripe for new forms of otherization and exclusion. Though
the drawing of boundaries between Us and the Other is not purely a new phenomenon—
history itself has been wielded as a tool to suppress the legitimacy of the claims of the
abject, ‘losing’ civilizations—the additional demarcation by way of ‘Enlightenment values’
has added yet another harmful dimension to the already existing mixture of prejudices
and stereotypes moving towards downright xenophobia.
Securing Norwegianness
Fear of the malignant Other-as-Islam; the heartfelt, yet tragically misplaced patriot care
for the nation; the binary construction of the European Enlightenment’s cultural superior-
ity: This is the core of Anders Behring Breivik’s motivations. This complex of sentiments
is the axiological trinity of the growing European populist right, and the rationale for
violent xenophobe groups that are once again rearing their ugly heads in Europe.
130. Kent Andersen and Christian Tybring-Gjedde, “Drøm fra Disneyland,” [Dream from Disneyland],
Aftenposten.no, August 25, 2010.
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When glanced through the eyes of the cultural form of life—of the fearful, Enlightened
Norwegian—immigration is eroding the very foundations of the lebenswelt ; threatening
not only a way of life, but life itself. Ultimately, nothing less than the complete erad-
ication of this threat will be enough to safeguard the nation. Whereas the seemingly
unfathomable violence demonstrated in the case of Breivik is eluding common sense, the
terrible logic of it all when displayed against the backdrop of existential fear, is numbing:
In a triumphant act of messianic solipsism, Anders Behring Breivik sacrificed himself to
stop the onslaught of the Other.
It is the cardinal submission of this thesis that the manipulation of fear on behalf of
the cultural nation, the construction of perceived threats towards it, and the discourse
on the inferiority of our neighbors, is dangerous and fundamentally detrimental to hu-
man flourishing: Such sentiments should be confronted, refuted and universally ridiculed
wherever articulated.
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Appendix
Though the need for an appendix is quite often not considered mandatory in a Master’s
thesis of this scope, certain considerations need to be explicitly stated—and I could
think of no fitting place to add these but here. Firstly, unless otherwise noted in the
text or footnotes, all translations of inline or indented quotes are of my own doing. I
have, naturally, attempted to add or alter nothing from the original text, while
promoting intelligibility over direct word-for-word translation. If this has resulted in
any misrepresentation of opinion or sentiment, I take full responsibility. It has been my
intention to accurately present the respective authors’ and actors’ opinions, avoiding any
unfair or personal bias in translation. All original articles and source material quoted
from Norwegian news sources are available through the links offered in the bibliography.
The bibliographic essay roughly explains the layout of the bibliography itself.
There are, however, some deliberations concerning sources that should be addressed in
more detail: I have chosen to ignore most of the respective reporters and journalists as
‘authors’ of newspaper reports in the strict sense, against the explicit advice of the
Chicago Manual of Style. Newspapers and similar material is merely given short
mention (e.g. Dagbladet.no, June 5, 2010) in the footnotes: complete citations including
full url-addresses is provided in the bibliography under the subheading “Newspapers
and other Media”. The reason for this choice is an editorial one: in a thesis concerned
with the use of language in media, the notes and bibliography would have been
cluttered with names of reporters or interns who happened to hold a microphone, and
who—while not belittling their work—has no importance to the task at hand. Opinion
pieces, however, can be found under ‘Works Cites’ in the bibliography.
Furthermore, every online news source cited has been archived by the WebCite
Consortium, a non-profit consortium supported by many different publishers and
editors that is usable without charge. As stated at their homepage, “webpages or
websites which are cited in scholarly articles are presumably important documents
worth preserving for readers, yet due to the volatility of the World Wide Web they are
at risk to disappear as a reference for future scholars. Adding WebCite® links to cited
URLs increases the likelihood that the cited work remains accessible and ensures that
readers have access to exactly the version as seen by the citing author.”131
I have, finally, opted to make available the earliest traceable ‘original’ of the
so-called ‘manifesto’ of the terrorist Anders Behring Breivik through both personal and
131. See Gunther Eysenbach and Centre for Global eHealth Innovation, WebCite, Online web-archiving
service, Cross-platform. Creative Commons BY-NC-SA v2.5 (Non-commercial Software). Available at
www.webcitation.org; For a published, ‘proper’ take on this service, see Gunther Eysenbach and
Mathieu Trudel, “Going, Going, Still There: Using the WebCite Service to Permanently Archive Cited
Web Pages,” Journal of Medical Internet Research 7 (5 2005).
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public online sources, links to which are printed in the bibliography. This, I am sure,
some people could find borderline reprehensible: the document contains, beyond
potentially incriminating instructions on bomb manufacturing, inflammatory and
hateful language and—for lack of a better word—ideology. Nevertheless, it is a
necessary source of information if one is to look into the motivations and world view
that made a Norwegian man commit such atrocious acts of violence towards the
Norwegian society as a whole, and towards young, politically active social democrats in
particular. Also, different versions and revisions of the ‘manifesto’ is already available
for anyone with access to Google and a few minutes to spare, though not yet—luckily,
perhaps—published in any traditional way.
Bibliography
The following bibliography lists all works cited within the text under the section Works
Cited, excluding news reports, broadcasts and the like, which are available under the
section titled “Newspapers and other Media”. A selection of manuals on style,
typography and typesetting has been listed under the section Selected Manuals and
Supportive Literature. By no means a complete record of all the different sources I have
consulted in my work, it attempts to give mention to a small selection of particularly
helpful publications, as a help for anyone interested in undertaking a similar endeavor.
The thesis at hand has attempted to conform to the 16th edition of the Chicago
Manual of Style, specifically its guidelines on “Notes and Bibliography”. Though the
Chicago style tries to be lenient in way of variation and customization, striving to
uphold the general principles when confronted with the variation of sources in print,
and even more so when using on-line sources, has been a challenging—yet ultimately a
rewarding—ordeal. Hopefully, no grave misapprehensions have tarnished this thesis.
For instance, footnotes citing newspaper sources had their url-addresses removed for
aesthetic purposes; these are provided in full in the bibliography. Also, in order to
ameliorate difficulties in finding the corresponding bibliography entries, titles were
stated in the notes for all newspaper articles.
Furthermore, the entire thesis has been written and typeset in LATEX, a markup
language that enables a large degree of typographic manipulation. Biblatex has been
employed for bibliographic management. Though both are very powerful tools, they
share a steep and protracted learning curve. As such, I have spent long hours browsing
through manuals and online message boards, looking for answers to important and
trifling formatting problems alike.
Finally, a short list of software that has been crucial in my work on this thesis
appears under the heading Computer Software, both as a token of gratitude to the
developers, and as a convenience to future readers of this thesis.
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